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FOR THE GOOD OF THE FEW: 
DEFENDING THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN 
POST-REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA
ABSTRACT
This study seeks to illuminate how Americans understood the freedom of the 
press in the years immediately following Independence. The question at the heart o f this 
inquiry is this: when John Adams and his Federalist Congress passed the Sedition Act of 
1798, criminalizing public criticism of the government less than a decade after the 
ratification of the Bill o f Rights, did this action constitute a betrayal o f previously defined 
principles, or an affirmation o f the British common law standards, which defined freedom 
o f the press as a liberty from prior restraint, rather than subsequent punishment?
The Commonwealth o f Virginia’s unique status as the state whose citizens and 
leaders produced the most impassioned objections to the Sedition Act recommend it as 
the ideal location for this study.
The first chapter examines the treatises penned by Virginians in response to the 
Sedition Act, and employs the Republican Synthesis in order to connect their libertarian 
understanding of freedom o f the press to the ideals o f the American Revolution. The 
second chapter demonstrates how these gentlemen politicians put their theories into 
practice when the Federal Government tried a case o f seditious libel in Virginia, and 
examines how they treated the defendant, a radical emigre journalist named James 
Thomson Callender, upon his release from prison.
In conclusion, this study asserts that while post-Revolutionary Virginians 
staunchly defended a libertarian interpretation of the freedom of the press, they did not 
recognize every voice as equally legitimate within the realm o f public opinion; 
eighteenth-century understandings o f the public sphere restricted participation in civic 
affairs to men o f class and letters, inhibiting the free expression o f artisan printers and 
lowly hack writers. In other words, what legal principle opened up (i.e. the unfettered 
circulation o f diverse views in society and politics), social prejudice restricted.
Emily T. Peterson 
Department of History 
The College of William and Mary 
Robert A. Gross
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FOR THE GOOD OF THE FEW: 
DEFENDING TtlE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA
INTRODUCTION:
DEFINING EARLY AMERICAN PRESS LIBERTY
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment o f  religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom o f speech, 
or o f  the press; or the right o f  the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government fo r  a redress o f  grievances. ”
-  First Amendment
“Silent enim leges inter arma. ” -  Cicero
The law is silent in wartime. The truth o f Cicero’s words has resonated throughout the 
American past. Less than a decade after ratifying the Bill o f  Rights, the Congress o f the 
United States, anxious about the Quasi-War with France and embroiled in fractious 
political wars at home, passed the Sedition Act and criminalized public criticism of the 
government. This measure established a lasting precedent for the restriction o f civil 
liberties during times of national crisis. A litany o f examples speaks to this trend, 
including Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 Emergency Wartime Measures, the Smith Act o f 
1940, the internment o f Japanese-Americans during World War II, and McCarthyism. 
Even today, in the wake of September 11, Americans are struggling to find an appropriate 
balance between personal liberties and national security.
How does one account for this repressive pattern in light o f America’s ostensible 
commitment to classical liberalism? When the nation’s founders guaranteed the freedom 
o f the press, did they intend to secure an unqualified liberty, or did they envision a 
governmental power to restrict expression under extenuating circumstances? In order to 
answer these important and timely questions, it is instructive to return to first instances. 
When the Sedition Act became law in 1798, many of the founders were still alive and 
engaged in the controversy surrounding the measure. The arguments they advanced on
2
3this occasion show that precise definitions o f the First Amendment’s scope remained 
elusive during the early national period.
Some understanding of the broad political climate shaping seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century England is essential to any analysis o f early American law. For the 
purposes o f this study, it will prove instructive to review the emergence o f English liberal 
thought. As western capitalism supplanted the feudal system at the close o f the Middle 
Ages, an emerging class of independent, working men empowered themselves through 
the adoption o f a new social philosophy known as liberalism. Placing an unprecedented 
degree o f faith in the natural goodness o f human beings, liberalism recognized man’s 
imperfection, yet held that the welfare o f society should be entrusted to those who 
composed it. Intellectual freedom and the subsequent reign o f reason would enable men 
to govern themselves effectively while engendering the greatest possible opportunity for 
human growth. Libertarians -  adherents o f the liberal philosophy — emphasized the 
limitless capacity o f the free, individual conscience, and fought the unnatural 
stultification that occurred whenever constituted authorities exerted artificial pressure on 
the individual.1
The practical objectives o f the liberal philosophy are to achieve a free interplay o f 
social and economic forces, checked only by self-imposed restraints, and to protect 
liberty from encroachments by the state. As historian George L. Cherry explains, the 
liberal movement in seventeenth-century England strived toward “the removal o f the 
obstacles to human liberty and the modification o f institutions so as to make man free.”
1 Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed., Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences vol. 9 (New York: the 
Macmillan Company, 1933), 435-42; Harold J. Laski, The Rise o f European Liberalism: An Essay in 
Interpretation (London: Unwin Books, 1962).
4Once these obstacles were destroyed, “liberals next sought the erection o f bulwarks that 
would guarantee that the rights of individuals would not be violated.” Such efforts to 
protect individual freedom from the coercive ambitions o f the Crown culminated in the 
execution o f Charles I in 1641, the affirmation of a constitutional monarchy, in which the 
king ruled at the behest o f Parliament, the Glorious Revolution o f 1689, and the first 
English Bill o f Rights. On the heels o f these monumental achievements, a coherent party 
o f libertarians emerged in the shape of the Real Whigs, a libertarian faction that 
incorporated Levellers, Diggers, and republicans, all o f whom agitated for reforms that 
transcended the achievements 1689. The most important issues at stake for these men 
included a strict enforcement o f the separation o f powers, the extension o f English 
liberties to all mankind, secularized education, the gradual expansion o f the franchise, 
and, o f particular importance to the present study, freedom o f thought.2
As Caroline Robbins attests, freedom o f thought was a topic constantly discussed 
among eighteenth-century libertarians. Focusing initially on issues of religious freedom, 
Whigs soon extended the notion that laws could not determine the truth of a man’s beliefs 
to the encompass political opinions as well. Throughout the seventeenth century, radical 
English Protestants had resisted religious conformity by arguing that although free 
theological debate would certainly instigate division and disorder, it was the only means 
through which God’s truth would ultimately emerge and unite the nation. This 6ttruth- 
will-out” argument neatly paralleled the emerging liberal belief that if men were to
2 Geroge L. Cherry, Early English Liberalism: Its emergence in Parliamentary Action, 1660-1702 
(New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), 13; Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Centiay 
Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstance o f English Liberal 
Thought from the Restoration o f Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1961), 3-21.
5successfully govern themselves, then open debate and reason must be allowed to prevail. 
Consequently, eighteenth-century Whigs, notably Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard in 
Cato’s Letters, secularized the Protestant argument for free expression. Open political 
debate, they argued, would ensure a “virtuous Administration” o f government as surely 
as limitless theological debate would reveal God’s truth. Concurrent to the development 
o f the ‘fruth-will out” argument, a relaxation royal licensing codes, which had regulated 
the print media since the reign o f Henry VIII, facilitated the publication of countless 
political tracts. Henceforth, freedom o f expression and o f the press would be inextricably 
wedded to the ideals o f libertarian Englishmen.
Admittedly, modem Americans do not subscribe to a single, unproblematic 
definition o f a free press, as contemporary debates over pornography and hate speech 
readily demonstrate. However, there are a few overarching principles which the majority 
o f citizens understand to be at the heart o f their First Amendment Protections. Political 
Scientist Robert W. T. Martin has delineated these fundamental tenets, which, he argues, 
define modem free press ideology. First, Americans believe that “comprehensive liberty 
o f political expression -  not mere elections -  is essential to genuinely democratic 
government.” Second, and perhaps most important, modem free press ideology concedes 
that truth does not always prevail in public discourse. Nevertheless, only overt acts 
against the state should be punishable by law. This policy “permits falsity to do its harm 
but contends that any attempt to outlaw falsity risks doing even more serious injury to the 
accuracy and robustness o f political discourse,” upon which democracy thrives. Finally,
3 Ibid., Robert W. T. Martin, The Free and Open Press: The Founding o f American Democratic 
Press Liberty, 1640-1800 (New York: New York University Press, 2001), chapter one.
6given the fact that published matter is rarely wholly true or false, public opinion is often 
the deciding factor in public debate, and therefore the “authoritative measure o f political 
legitimacy.” These are the themes that undergird much modem discussion of free press 
theory and First Amendment jurisprudence. In many unfortunate respects, they represent 
the American ideal, rather than the reality, but they are precepts to which the majority o f 
modem Americans aspire. This was not the case at the time o f the American Revolution, 
when the libertarian founders o f the new Republic fought hard to entrench this 
unprecedented definition o f free expression.
According to the English legal tradition from which the American system 
emerged, the freedom of the press referred to a guarantee against prior restraint, rather 
than protection from subsequent punishment. Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries 
on the Laws o f  England provided the authoritative definition o f English common law. 
Blackstone explained that “every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments 
he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he 
publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences o f his 
own temerity.”4 Thus, Blackstone distinguished between the “liberty” and 
“licentiousness” o f the press; the law afforded writers and publishers considerable 
freedom o f action, but held them responsible for any abuse o f that autonomy. This 
conception o f a free press differs significantly from modem American free press 
ideology, and it is crucial to acknowledge this disparity in order to avoid examining the 
Sedition Act through a presentist lens. In its earliest manifestation, the freedom o f the
4 David S. Berkowitz and Samuel E. Thome, eds., Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws o f England, 4 vols. (New York, 1978), 4: 152.
7press was a strictly limited right, far more restrictive than modem observers might 
assume. This distinction appears most clearly when one considers the severe constraints 
placed upon a printer’s right to criticize government officials.
Among the most “improper, mischievous, [and] illegal” abuses of the press was 
seditious libel — the publication of “malicious, scandalous, and slanderous words” 
intended to damage an official’s reputation. According to the long-standing legal 
principle o f De Scandalis Magnatum, officials o f the realm required honor above 
suspicion in order to execute their duties properly. Therefore, any attempt to undermine 
this honor through public criticism was tantamount to an attempt to undermine the 
stability o f the Commonwealth itself. Advanced by Parliament in 1275 during the reign 
o f Edward I, De Scandalis Magnatum recognized the potential for words to injure the 
government. Charles I propelled the concept into heavy usage in his prerogative Court o f 
the Star Chamber, which harshly punished Puritan writers and other nonconformists. 
When Parliament abolished the Star Chamber in 1642, the common law courts acquired 
exclusive jurisdiction over libel persecutions, and continued to employ Star Chamber 
doctrines. Blackstone later confirmed “the honour o f peers is so highly tendered by the 
law, that [to libel them] is much more penal” than to attack the reputation o f an ordinary 
citizen. Furthermore, the Blackstonian principle known as “bad tendency” allowed that 
“an action on the case may be had, without proving any particular damage to have 
happened, but merely upon the probability that it might happen.” Hence the publication 
o f a libel against a government official might not be seditious in and o f itself, but as such 
words might inspire a reader to insurrection, they may be treated as such. Ultimately,
8English jurists defined the common law crime o f seditious libel broadly and regarded it as 
one o f the most heinous abuses o f a free press.5
Despite the inherent tendency o f De Scandalis Magnatum to limit public 
discourse, many early American leaders believed that officers o f the newly formed 
Republic required similar protections from criticism. Others were unwilling to accept a 
legal principle that was so intimately connected to the politically divisive Star Chamber. 
These critics retorted sarcastically that if a legislative control over the press was 
necessary in America because it existed in Britain, then perhaps the tranquility o f the 
nation and the personal safety o f the president also required the protection o f a standing 
army, similar to the one that preserved peace and kept the monarch on the throne across 
the Atlantic.6 Clearly, the revolutionary break with Great Britain forced Americans to 
reconsider the applicability o f English common law principles such as De Scandalis 
Magnatum to their unique system o f government. The conclusions that they ultimately 
reached have been the focus o f contentious scholarly debates, particularly during the past 
fifty years.
Historians began to write in earnest about the Sedition Act at a very propitious 
moment in this nation’s history. As the United States emerged from World War II and 
began to face the varied threats o f the Cold War, many scholars began to wonder about 
the relationship between national security and the freedom o f political expression. 
Zechariah Chafee’s Free Speech in the United States (1948), John C. Miller’s Crisis in
5 Berkowitz and Thome, eds., Blackstone's Commentaries, 1:402,3: 124. For a concise history of 
the concept of De Scandalis Magnatum, see Jeffery A. Smith, Printers and Press Freedom: The Ideology o f 
Early American Journalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 60.
6 George Hay, Two Essays on the Liberty o f the Press (1803; reprint New York: Da Capo Press, 
1970), 29.
9Freedom (1951), and James Morton Smith’s seminal Freedom’s Fetters (1956) all 
pointed to the Sedition Act as a warning about the danger o f subordinating liberty to 
authority. Each o f these authors argued that one of the many goals o f the Revolution was 
to “[abolish] the English common law crime o f  seditious libel,” and that late-eighteenth- 
century Americans understood the First Amendment to have achieved this end.7 For 
Chafee, Miller, and Smith, the Bill o f Rights ensured a liberty o f the press that meant far 
more than the Blackstonian freedom from prior restraint. Hence, they all envisioned the 
Sedition Act as a violation o f  principles solidified during the movement for Independence 
and the formation o f the new national government. These scholars identified this lapse as 
the first in a historical trend wherein the United States government will “retreat to 
repression” when faced with national crises. Given the political tensions that permeated 
mid-twentieth-century America, it is plausible that the ideological climate influenced 
these scholars’ readings o f the historical record. Indeed, later scholars have suggested 
that a present-minded bias inspired these early interpretations.8
In 1960 constitutional scholar Leonard Levy published a revisionist interpretation 
o f the Sedition Act that changed the way historians think about the original meanings o f 
the First Amendment. After scouring the records o f legislative debates surrounding the 
ratification o f the Constitution and the Bill o f  Rights, Levy concluded that the evidence 
suggests “no passion on the part o f anyone to grind underfoot the common law o f liberty
7 Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1948); John Chester Miller, Crisis in Freedom: the Alien and Sedition Acts (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co., 1951); James Morton Smith, Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil 
Liberties (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956); for quotation, see Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 431.
8 For a comprehensive analysis o f the “Jeffersonian bias” of these works, see Mark DeWolfe 
Howe, review of Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties, by James 
Morton Smith, WMQ, 3d Ser., 4 (1956): 573-76.
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of the press.” It was not until John Adams signed the Sedition Act that anyone began to 
discuss the meaning of a free press in what might be defined as libertarian terms. 
Furthermore, because opposition to this Federalist measure was so politically expedient 
for Jeffersonian Republicans, the 1798 debate concerning the First Amendment is 
“suspect” as “a revelation o f prior opinion.” Ultimately, Levy argues that freedom of the 
press as the founders envisioned it was closer to Blackstone’s definition than to the 
modem definition o f press liberty Americans have come to cherish. This analysis is 
hardly remarkable, “since the origins and conduct o f the American Revolution were 
unrelated to any hostility to the common law.” However, in asserting these claims, Levy 
advances an argument that has been challenged by the historiography of the American 
Revolution that emerged during the late 1960s.9
The republican synthesis, advanced by such historians as Bernard Bailyn and 
Gordon S. Wood, provides a framework for examining the Revolution in the context o f a 
transatlantic political culture. These scholars sought to illuminate the continuity between 
England’s radical Whigs and American patriots, and to describe the constant struggle 
between liberty and authority these thinkers saw as the driving force of politics. Indeed, 
Bailyn’s Ideological Origins o f  the American Revolution counts England’s radical writers 
and opposition politicians among the primary influences guiding Revolutionary rhetoric,
9 Leonard W. Levy, Legacy o f Suppression: Freedom o f Speech and Press in Early American 
History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960), 233,237,247. According 
to Jeffrey L. Pasley, Levy’s “revisionist interpretation” has now become the “new orthodoxy.” Adherents 
to Levy’s thesis, called New Libertarians, include Walter Bems, “Freedom of the Press and the Alien and 
Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal,” in Philip B. Kurland, ed., 1970: Supreme Court Review (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), 109-59; Norman L. Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An 
Interpretive History o f the Law o f Libel (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). See 
also Jeffrey L. Pasley, “The Tyranny of Printers”: Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic 
(Charlottesville, Va.: The University Press o f Virginia, 2001), 126.
11
while Wood’s Creation o f  the American Republic suggests that the founders initially 
sought to establish a new nation, or “Christian Sparta,” immune to the political corruption 
that England’s Whigs resisted.10 Contrary to Levy, these scholars find the origins of the 
Revolution in a transatlantic culture o f republican opposition to specific common law 
practices. While Revolutionary patriots did embrace British legal traditions as a part o f 
their Anglo-American identity, they also joined England’s radical Whigs in advocating 
sweeping changes, such as “alterations in the definition o f seditious libel so as to permit 
full freedom o f the press; and the total withdrawal o f government control over the 
practice of religion.”11 Bailyn and Wood track the transmission of these radical demands 
to American patriots, who incorporated them in a new kind o f government. In doing so, 
these historians provide a broader context for the emergence o f free speech ideology than 
Levy has imagined.
Although the works o f Bailyn and Wood give the ideological connection between 
Britain and America its fullest expression, historians have long recognized the 
importance o f radical Whig principles in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world. 
Anthony Lincoln’s Some Political and Social Ideas o f  English Dissent (1938) and 
Caroline Robbins’s The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (1961) emphasize the 
centrality o f British nonconformists’ influence on the thoughts and actions o f American 
patriots. Robbins in particular paints a heroic picture o f English Whigs spanning three 
generations. Repeatedly failing to affect parliamentary policy, these men secured their
10 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967)*see especially chap. 2, “Sources and Traditions”;
Gordon S. Wood, Creation o f the American Republic (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1969), see especially chap. 3, “Moral Reformation.”
11 Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 30,47.
12
lasting legacy with the independence o f their brethren across the Atlantic. “The
American constitution employs many o f the devices which the Real Whigs vainly
besought Englishmen to adopt,” Robbins explains, “and in it must be found their abiding
memorial.” According to this point o f view, the American Revolution represents the first
major victory in a decades-long struggle for political rights that united men across
generations and, indeed, across nations. As legal scholar David Rabban elaborates, the
American Revolution represented the first significant implementation o f radical Whig
1 ?thought, and thus “became a major event for the entire western world.”
However, it was not English radical thought alone that inspired late-eighteenth- 
century Americans, who were especially sensitive to the geopolitics o f their time. 
International events, notably, the French Revolution and the ensuing wars between 
Britain and France, inflamed and polarized political opinion throughout the Atlantic 
world. The outbreak o f hostilities between the two European powers in 1793 inspired 
such vehement reactions in the United States that the enforcement o f American neutrality 
within the jurisdiction o f Virginia became one o f Governor Henry Lee’s top priorities.13 
Despite President Washington’s parting admonition for Americans to remain detached 
from European conflicts, the nation’s leading citizens continued to take sides and 
speculate wildly about plots conceived by their imagined foes. Federalist Congressman 
Leven Powell feared that the Virginia Assembly’s apparent support o f France would
12 For a comprehensive historiographical review of English radical thought, see David M. Rabban, 
“The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History,” Stanford 
Law Review, 37 (1985): 828-829, emphasis added. Anthony Lincoln, Some Political and Social Ideas of 
English Dissent, 1763-1800 (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1938); Robbins, Eighteenth- 
Century Commonwealthman, 3-4.
13 Thomas E. Templin, “Henry ‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee: A Biography,” PhD dissertation, 
University of Kentucky, Lexington, 332. Templin identifies neutrality as Lee’s third major concern, 
ranking behind Indian defense and legal disputes with the Indiana Company.
13
“induce her to send an Army into our Country under the idea that those whom she calls 
her party here would join it,” while his Republican colleague, Henry Tazwell, predicted 
that the Commonwealth’s proclivities would instead inspire “old and new England” to 
join forces against the South.14 Given this abundant partisan paranoia, it is difficult to 
imagine that any degree of political cooperation existed between the citizens o f the 
United States, Britain, and France. Nevertheless the radical Whig tradition continued to 
provide a political forum wherein like-minded English, French, and American dissidents 
could come together and share ideas. Eugene Link’s Democratic-Republican Societies 
(1942) and R.R. Palmer’s The Age o f  the Democratic Revolution (1959, 1964) illuminate 
the ideological trends that linked this network o f political societies in America, England, 
and France beginning in the early 1790s.
Thomas Cooper, whom historian Michael Durey calls tcthe archetypal radical o f 
his era,” personifies the international cooperation described by Link and Palmer. In his 
native England, Cooper attacked the slave trade as a form o f political tyranny and 
generally made himself obnoxious to the conservative leadership o f Parliament. In 1792, 
he traveled to France as a delegate from the Manchester Democratic Society, and gained 
access to the Jacobin Club of Paris through a connection with Robespierre himself. Upon 
immigrating to the United States in 1799, he undertook the editorship o f the 
Northumberland Gazette and levied severe criticism at the Adams administration, earning 
himself an indictment under the Sedition Act. Cooper’s story underlines the scholarship
14 Leven Powell to Burr Powell, 8 January 1800, Powell Family Papers, 1775-1927, Manuscripts 
and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary; Henry Tazwell to 
Richard Cocke, 29 June 1798, Henry Tazwell Papers, 1795-1798, Manuscripts and Rare Books 
Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary.
14
o f the republican synthesis, demonstrating that the arguments levied against the Sedition 
Act in 1798 represented the logical amplification o f ideas that had begun to circulate over 
a century earlier, and subsequently grew compelling enough to transcend the fierce 
enmities that separated most English, French, and American citizens.15
The republican synthesis has elucidated a major problem in the historiography o f 
early American civil liberties. Scholars seem disposed to view the 1798 crisis in terms of 
an unlikely dichotomy: the founders either rejected Blackstonian principles and then 
betrayed their own ideals (Chafee, Miller, and Smith), or they codified the English 
common law and then opposed it for political reasons (Levy and the New Libertarians).
In reality, the evolution o f American law is more gradual than either o f these models will 
allow. Legal principles evolve slowly and take time to become fully enmeshed in the 
national consciousness. A few recent works o f scholarship have advanced our 
understanding o f this fact significantly. J.R. Pole argues that although English common 
law was the guiding legal force in colonial America, it was “organic” rather than “static,” 
and Americans interpreted and applied the law differently from one location to the next. 
Robert W. T. Martin’s The Free and Open Press (2001) suggests that the modem concept 
o f democratic press liberty emerged from a dynamic relationship between diverse 
principles, rather than the singular process o f one ideology giving way to another.
15 Eugene Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1942); R. R. Palmer, The Age o f the Democratic Revolution, 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1970). For Biographical information on Cooper, see James Morton Smith, Freedom’s 
Fetters, 307-33; Francis Wharton, State Trials o f the United States during the Administrations o f 
Washington and Adams. (1849; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 659-80.
15
Together, these scholars are forging a more complex understanding o f the emergence o f 
free press ideology in early America.16
In a 1993 William and Mary Quarterly article entitled “Reflections on American 
Law and the American Revolution,” J.R. Pole reaffirms the existence o f a libertarian 
press tradition long before it achieved its most coherent expression at the end o f the 
eighteenth century. Pole contends that the truest expression o f popular sovereignty in 
colonial America emerged from local juries, rather than deliberative bodies. Ordinary 
citizens possessed greater access to county courts than to legislatures, which only 
convened for a few weeks every year. He explains that modem scholars do not tmly 
appreciate the “supplementary agency o f  representation” that existed in the colonial 
courts, because they are blinded by the separation o f powers doctrine, which was merely 
“a principle in process o f formulation” at the time o f the Revolution. Hence, the 
literature does not recognize the extent to which “the jury’s power to ‘find’ the law could 
on occasion appear tantamount to a law-making authority.” Most importantly, juries 
issued their own interpretations o f the common law based on “local knowledge and 
custom.” As Peter Charles Hoffer confirms, “common law was supreme, but it was 
also... whatever the local jury said it was.” Therefore, community mores and practices 
frequently changed before the law itself did, creating tensions between legal precedents 
and nascent customs, and inspiring jurors to honor practice above theory. This is
16 Martin, The Free and Open Press; J.R Pole, ‘Reflections on American Law and the American 
Revolution,” in WMQ, 3d Ser., 50 (1993): 142.
16
precisely what occurred in eighteenth-century America regarding the common law 
doctrine o f seditious libel, a fact that Levy fatally ignores.17
Perhaps the greatest weakness o f the New Libertarian interpretation rests in its 
failure to acknowledge the disparity between theory and practice regarding the freedom 
o f the press. In a 1961 critique o f Levy’s argument, Merrell Jensen revealed that 
although the early American press was not free “as a matter o f law,” published criticism 
o f the government was searing and endemic in late-eighteenth-century America.18 
Reviews echoing Jensen’s censure grew so strident that in 1985, Levy expanded and 
revised his book, confessing that he had erred “in asserting that the American experience 
with freedom o f political expression was as slight as the legal and conceptual 
understanding was narrow.”19 George Anastaplo highlights the importance o f this 
incongruity by arguing that the enthusiasm with which many respectable Americans 
libeled George III and John Adams reveals the true nature o f early American attitudes 
regarding freedom of the press. “The offense [of seditious libel] was one that seems to 
have been committed on the statute books but not by the moral consciousness o f the 
community,” Anastaplo writes. “When the better men o f the community openly break 
the law, it is a law which is destined to be replaced, for it is already dying.”20 Hence, 
Pole’s argument that local juries effectively proclaimed common law by applying local
17 Pole, “Reflections on American Law,” 132, 133, 137, 139; Peter Charles Hoffer, “Custom as 
Law: A Comment on J.R. Pole’s ‘Reflections’,” in WMQ, 3d Ser., 50 (1993): 166.
18 Merrill Jensen, review of Legacy o f Suppression: Freedom o f Speech and Press in Early 
American History, by Leonard W. Levy, Harvard Law Review, 75 (1961): 457.
19Leonard W. Levy, Emergence o f a Free Press (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), x. 
Emergence is an expanded and revised version of legacy of Suppression.
20 George Anastaplo, review of Legacy o f Suppression: Freedom o f Speech and Press in Early 
American History, by Leonard W. Levy, New York University Law Review, 39 (1964): 738.
17
standards to legal precedents, reinforced by Levy’s critics, reveals that the Sedition Act 
o f 1798 was based on principles that many Americans had already renounced.
Historians Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick confirm Pole’s analysis o f the 
Sedition Act as a dead letter law in their authoritative analysis o f the early national 
period, The Age o f Federalism (1993). According to these authors, the “rusty principle” 
o f  seditious libel was not only increasingly unpopular with colonial juries, it became 
“flatly incompatible” with the new American system o f government. “Even as a 
theoretical premise,” Elkins and McKitrick explain, seditious libel “had come to have 
little or no pertinence in the emerging state o f political practice in America.” As Madison 
had envisaged in Federalist No. 10, factionalism inevitably emerged in the free society 
established by the Constitution. Because factions could not be stifled without 
suppressing liberty, a necessarily greater tolerance for open criticism o f  public officials 
developed during the last decades o f the eighteenth century. It was against this backdrop 
o f increasingly diverse opinions and interests that the Republican Party fashioned itself 
into a standing opposition, expressly dedicated to the object o f challenging incumbent 
officials. According to Elkins and McKitrick, it was the Federalists’ inability to 
understand the concept o f a loyal opposition -  dedicated to the nation’s best interests but 
defining those interests differently from the men in power -  that caused them to grasp 
desperately at the archaic principle o f seditious libel. In promoting the Sedition Act, they 
thought they were assaulting the nascent party system while their opponents saw an 
attack upon basic civil liberties. The most intriguing aspect o f Elkins and McKitrick’s 
interpretation is this implication that the Federal Constitution secured the obsolescence of
18
seditious libel in multiple ways, many o f  them far less direct than the strictures o f the 
First Amendment.21
If  Pole, Elkins, and McKitrick have complicated our understanding o f free press 
ideology before 1798, then Robert W. T. Martin accomplishes as much for the centuries 
following the Sedition Act. In The Free and Open Press, Martin emphasizes the 
development and interplay of two distinct paradigms regarding the role o f the press in 
early American political culture. The first model stresses the importance o f a free press 
as the people’s primary defense against government corruption and tyranny. This 
distinctively republican ideology was accompanied by the more liberal model o f  an open 
press, which “stressed the individual right o f every man to air his sentiments for all to 
consider, regardless o f his political perspective or the consequences for the people’s 
liberty.” Consonance did not always exist between these two disparate lines o f thought. 
During the Revolution, for example, many colonists maintained that a press open to 
loyalist arguments threatened the people’s liberties. Many publishers consequently 
repressed viewpoints inconsistent with the patriot cause. Hence, Martin argues that 
American free press ideology is ambivalent and “intrinsically contestable” because it 
attempts to reconcile social cohesion and individual autonomy, both o f which are 
necessary for democratic legitimacy.
In Martin’s estimation, it is counterproductive to the study o f press liberty to try 
and determine when the republican tradition (the free press) ended and the liberal one 
(the open press) began, as so many scholars have done when debating various aspects o f
21 Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age o f Federalism: The Early American Republic, 
1788-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 701,713.
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early American political culture. Instead, Martin seeks to identify the moment at which 
“the distinct, rhetorical power o f the terms ‘free’ and ‘open’ were lost as they became 
largely synonymous.” He ultimately locates this convergence in the post-Revolutionary 
era, when the proliferation o f newspapers made an open press possible even as the norm 
of journalistic impartiality vanished, and the Sedition Act crisis confirmed that “both an 
ongoing discourse that represented the diversity o f sentiments and a public opinion that 
acted as the authoritative political standard” were essential to a representative republic. 
Most importantly, Martin argues that the intellectual fusion o f these terms did not 
eliminate tensions represented by the seemingly incongruous elements o f the free and 
open press, which are still very much alive in modem free press ideology. As Martin 
attests, “our press liberty tradition continues to exhibit contradictory impulses toward 
liberation and suppression.”22
Martin’s observations about the ambivalent nature of American free press 
ideology have significant implications for the scholarly debate surrounding the Sedition 
Act. It is futile to quibble over the precise date marking America’s transition from a 
Blackstonian to a libertarian interpretation o f the freedom o f the press, Martin tells us, 
when the idea o f a unified and universally accepted definition o f the First Amendment is 
specious to begin with. More than anything, the republican synthesis demonstrates that 
libertarian interpretations existed alongside Blackstonian principles during the 
revolutionary and early national periods, and strains o f thought reflective o f both the free 
and open press survive as conflicting aspects o f modem free press ideology. In fact 
would appear that early American libertarians expressed greater concern for the free press
22 Martin, Free and Open Press, 2,4,11,123, 126.
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aspects o f the First Amendment than they did for open press ideologies. If  Jeffersonian 
Americans had truly accepted the full implications o f expression that was both free and 
open, then the repressive trend exemplified by the 1919 Red Scare, Japanese internment 
camps, and McCarthyism would sully this nation’s past. Ultimately, the history o f free 
press ideology in America is the story o f discordant principles competing for ascendancy. 
During times o f national crisis — whether precipitated by international war or domestic 
political upheaval -  free press doctrines and the suppression o f dissent prevail.
Martin’s framework helps explain fundamental issues that have befuddled 
scholars on both sides o f the Sedition Act debate, the most obvious being republican state 
prosecutions for seditious libel after 1800. The libertarian critics o f the Sedition Act 
genuinely believed in the importance o f a free and open press, but when their own power 
was threatened, their level o f commitment to the individual right o f every man to air his 
sentiments for all to consider waned. Indeed, it became clear in the days immediately 
following the Jeffersonian triumph that not all forms o f opinion were equally welcome in 
the civic discourse that the Sedition Act’s opponents had defended. In particular, 
Jefferson and his followers ultimately shunned the radical journalists on whom they had 
relied to carry their libertarian message to the public in 1798. The explanation for this 
inconstancy lies in the distinction that early national leaders maintained between two 
disparate forms o f expression: public opinion and popular opinion. This prejudice led 
Jeffersonians to retrench in terms o f open press ideology and fall short o f the modem 
ideal o f First Amendment protections, a failing which would be repeated by American 
leaders for generations to come.
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Ultimately, the theory supporting a free and open press was fully developed by 
1798, but the universal application o f this theory to include all segments of American 
society was not. It is the dual purpose o f this study to demonstrate the consistency with 
which Jeffersonian Republicans -  particularly those residing in Virginia — defended 
freedom of thought and expression throughout the post-Revolutionary era, and to explain 
the paradox o f their simultaneous contempt for the radical journalists who — more than 
any other group -  gave voice to the theory of democratic press liberty. As the epicenter 
o f the Republican opposition as well as the place where Jefferson himself recruited, 
patronized, and then abandoned a radical author o f libertarian sentiments, the 
Commonwealth o f Virginia provides the logical venue for this investigation. By 
reviewing the political writings o f Virginia’s leading citizens and reexamining the case of 
James Thomson Callender, this study seeks to prove that Republican understandings of 
the freedom o f the press at the time o f the Sedition Act were significantly more advanced 
than English common law standards, yet still fell short o f the modem American standard.
CHAPTER I
‘USHACKLED, UNLIMITED, AND UNDEFINED:’
PRESS LIBERTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINA, 1776-1811
“The freedom o f the press is one o f the great bulwarks o f liberty, and can never 
be restrained but by despotic government. ”
— Virginia Bill o f Rights
Virginia’s unique status as the state whose citizens and leaders produced the most 
impassioned objections to the Sedition Act make it the ideal setting for examining free 
press ideology in the early Republic. The passage o f the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions, penned by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, sent shockwaves 
throughout the nation, as the remaining states unanimously rejected this radical attempt to 
override the federal government. Furthermore, Virginians wrote four o f the eight 
political treatises that Levy identifies as the definitive libertarian arguments for an 
unqualified freedom o f the press.25 Virginia subsequently developed a reputation for its 
liberal stance on the constitutionality o f the Sedition Act and caused many o f the 
measure’s offenders to view the Old Dominion as a safe haven. Fearing prosecution, 
radical journalists such as John Daly Burk and James Thomson Callender sought refuge 
within Virginia’s borders. The latter writer became the only man to stand trial under the 
Sedition Act in the South when Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase descended upon 
Richmond for the express purpose o f enforcing federal authority in the recalcitrant state. 
Even then, the people o f Virginia rallied in support o f Callender, raising a collection for
25 These treatises include George Hay, Essays on the Liberty o f the Press]; James Madison 
“Virginia Resolutions” and Report on the State o f Virginia, collected in The Virginia Report o f1799-1800 
(1850; reprint New York: Da Capo Press, 1970); and St. George Tucker, “Of the Right of Conscience; and 
of Freedom of Speech and the Press,” in the Appendix to vol. 1 of Blackstone ’s Commentaries: With Notes 
o f Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, o f the Federal Government o f the United States; and o f the 
Commonwealth o f Virginia, 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1803), hereafter cited as Tucker’s Blackstone. See Levy, 
Legacy of Suppression, 260-269.
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his legal fees and providing him with the best legal defense the Old Dominion had to 
offer.26 Clearly, Virginians were uniquely committed to opposing the sedition measure.
Many historians have attributed the exceptionalism o f Virginia’s position to the 
state’s political makeup, unjustly claiming that Virginia Republicans only exploited the 
issue in order to challenge their Federalist opponents. However, it is overly simplistic to 
reduce the Sedition Act debate to an ancillary argument in a hostile power struggle 
between rival parties. To be sure, Virginia was home to the leading members o f the loyal 
opposition during John Adams’s administration. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and 
James Monroe formed a powerful triumvirate and directed Republican policy on the 
national level, while their fellow party members dominated the Virginia state legislature. 
In 1798 when the Sedition Act passed into law, Federalists held only four o f the nineteen 
congressional seats allotted to the Old Dominion 27 Given the disproportionate balance 
o f political affiliation in this state, it is easy to understand why some have argued that 
Virginians only opposed the Sedition Act because Adams and his party supported it. The 
truth was not that simple. It is instructive that only one o f the four Federalists 
representing the state in Congress, Thomas Evans, dared to vote in favor of the Sedition 
Act.28
26 For information on John “Daly” Burk and the trial of Janies Thomson Callender, see Michael 
Durey, Transatlantic Radicals and the Early American Republic (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of 
Kansas, 1997), and “With the Hammer o f Truth”: James Thomson Callender and America’s Early 
National Heroes (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1990).
27 Charles T. Cullen, “Congressional Election Campaign: Editor’s Note, ” in Cullen et al., eds., 
The Papers o f John Marshall, 10 vols. to date (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University o f North Carolina Press, 
1974-) 3:495.
28 Cullen, “Congressional Election,” in Cullen et al., The Papers o f John Marshall, 3:495. 
Indeed, in the House, only four of the forty-four representatives to vote in favor of the law hailed from 
south of the Potomac.
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Furthermore, there is evidence that at least one Virginia Congressman lost his seat 
specifically due to his stance on this issue. In January of 1801, Representative Leven 
Powell o f Leesburg, Virginia, informed his son that the House had recently voted on the 
continuation o f the Sedition Act, which was scheduled to expire that March. “As I was
sure that my constituents were not afraid o f a law which went to punish Vice and prevent
0 0insurrections,” he wrote, “I gave it my hearty concurrence.” The evidence suggests that 
Powell had gravely misjudged the views o f his constituents. On February 20, 1801, a 
loyal supporter by the name of Thomas Sims wrote to inform Powell that he was losing 
favor among the electorate. “Your votes for the.. .continuance of the Sedition Act are the 
principle [s/c.] objections stated,” Sims declared. That fall, Powell lost his bid for 
reelection.30 Ultimately, the people o f Virginia guarded their right o f free expression so 
tenaciously that Federalists who endorsed restrictions did so at their own peril.
Opposition to the doctrine o f seditious libel was not a partisan issue in the Old Dominion.
On the contrary, sectional loyalties often trumped party divisions when 
determining an individual’s stance on the Sedition Act. The local autonomy that Pole 
emphasizes presented an important dilemma for state sovereignty when the federal 
government attempted to codify and enforce the English common law in 1798. The 
governments o f the various states, having evolved out o f the British colonial system, had 
adopted common law standards when formulating their own directives and codified
29 Leven Powell to Burr Powell, 25 January 1801, Powell Family Papers.
30 Thomas Sims to Leven Powell, 20 February 1801, Powell Family Papers. Powell was replaced 
by his Democratic-Republican predecessor, Richard Brent, who had represented Virginia’s seventeenth 
district in the fourth and fifth congresses. The election was very close, but it heralded the end of 
Federalism in this district of Virginia. See Michael J. Dubin, United States Congressional Elections,
1788-1997: The Official Results o f the 1st Through 105th Congresses (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & 
Company, Inc., 1998), 23.
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several modifications in order to reflect the changes precipitated by the Revolution. The 
widespread abolition o f entail and primogeniture provides the most conspicuous example 
o f these adaptations.31 A federal application o f the common law such as the Sedition Act 
brought state and federal jurisdictions into conflict. When the national government 
enacted legislation intended to enforce the legal principles o f England, it inexorably 
rescinded the various changes adopted at different times by the several state legislatures. 
Many historians argue that when opponents o f the Sedition Act objected that the measure 
was unconstitutional, they alleged an infraction against the Tenth Amendment as 
frequently as they referred to a violation o f the liberty o f the press. This is a compelling 
claim, but it does not necessarily contradict the assertion that Virginia's particular 
resistance to the law indicated a more liberal interpretation o f the First Amendment.
The Commonwealth o f Virginia issued a particularly clamorous defense o f the 
Tenth Amendment in 1798. Consequently, Levy contends that state sovereignty, rather 
than a genuine desire to protect freedom o f speech and the press, was “probably the 
dominant Virginian concern.”32 The validity o f this position is reinforced by Thomas 
Jefferson’s later reflections on the Republican view o f the Sedition Act: “while we deny 
that Congress have a right to controul the freedom o f the press,” the president wrote in 
1804, “we have asserted the right o f the states, and their exclusive right to do so.”33
31 For an excellent example of the revolutionary break with common law primogeniture in 
Virginia, see Holly Brewer, “Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: ‘Ancient Feudal Restraints’ and 
Revolutionary Reform,” in WMQ, 3d Ser., 54 (1997): 316.
32 Levy, Legacy o f Suppression, 219.
33 Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, 11 September 1804, in Lester J. Cappon, ed., The A dams- 
Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams 
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 278-80. Jefferson’s later views regarding 
the freedom and licentiousness of the press have provided a great deal of fodder for historians seeking to 
undermine his libertarian legacy. However, the statements that Jefferson made during his presidential years
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However, it is unnecessary and in fact impossible to divorce Virginia’s effort to prevent 
concurrent jurisdictions over seditious libel from her commitment to a free press. Indeed, 
Virginians were vigilant about their autonomy within the union because they had come to 
interpret English common law -  particularly regarding the freedom o f thought and 
expression — more liberally than many o f their fellow countrymen. They proved more 
eager to establish legal independence than the citizens o f any other state, launching a 
commission to revise and codify Virginia’s laws according to the principles o f the 
Revolution even as the war raged on, and overhauling the judicial system within the first 
few years o f peace.34 By 1811, the General Court (Virginia’s highest judicial body) had 
nullified the concept o f seditious libel in The Commonwealth v. John Morris, Jr., 
confirming the Commonwealth’s libertarian commitment to an open press. In the end, 
Virginians sought to retain their exclusive right to control public criticism o f government 
officials because they did not wish to exercise any such control at all.
Contrary to Levy’s thesis, a libertarian definition of freedom o f the press took root 
in Virginia during the Revolutionary era, and grew to fruition during the Sedition Act 
crisis. This assertion is echoed by the political literature produced by libertarian 
Virginians in response to the law’s passage. Legal pundits and political theorists such as 
James Madison, St. George Tucker, and George Hay wrote about the freedom of the
are - to borrow Levy’s phrase - suspect as a revelation of prior opinion. One must consider that by the time 
Jefferson wrote this letter, he had himself become the victim of a vicious and very personal smear 
campaign, in which James Thomson Callender first suggested a sexual connection between h e  master of 
Monticello and “Dusky Sally” Hemmings. This experience must surely have biased his views.
Furthermore, in writing this letter, Jefferson was attempting to repair the very important, yet horribly 
shattered friendship that he had once maintained with John and Abigail Adams. Historians should be wary 
of Jefferson’s efforts to appease his former friends, who had expressed feelings of personal betrayal at 
Jefferson’s opposition to the Sedition Law and overt support of Adams’s calumniators.
34 Pole, “Reflections on American Law,” 123.
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press in such a manner as to connect it directly to the practical accomplishments o f the 
Revolution, as well as to the radical Whig tradition and Enlightenment thought that had 
provided the war’s ideological impulse. Furthermore, they argued that Revolutionary 
documents such as the states’ bills o f rights and instruments o f constitutional ratification 
codified this new understanding. According to these men, the Sedition Act was in every 
way a violation o f the aims and accomplishments o f America’s break with England.
As the Father o f the Constitution and the primary author o f the Bill o f  Rights, 
James Madison was uniquely qualified to comment on the original meanings of the First 
Amendment. His constitutional philosophy clearly posited that a free and open press was 
essential in a limited and responsible government that invested sovereignty in the people. 
“In the United States,” as opposed to Great Britain, he wrote, “the executive magistrates 
are not held to be infallible, nor the legislature to be omnipotent; and both being elective, 
are both responsible.” Therefore, American citizens maintained a right and a 
responsibility publicly to evaluate their elected officials and ensure that they did not 
overreach their constitutional mandate. This fundamental innovation in the American 
system o f government was secured by the ratification o f the Constitution, and it rendered 
the legal principle o f seditious libel obsolete. Madison stressed that if an elected official 
failed to execute the public trust, then the people must be free to express their sovereignty 
by bringing this offender into public contempt and disrepute, and this process 
necessitated mechanisms o f free communication among the people. For this reason,
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Madison adamantly asserted that the American republic would not survive without a 
degree o f press freedom that transcended English common law restrictions.35
Madison’s philosophy concerning the necessity o f new legal standards for the 
press in America reached its fullest expression in his Virginia Resolutions and subsequent 
Report on the State o f Virginia. In 1798 the Virginia state legislature passed a series o f 
resolutions that declared the sedition law unconstitutional and entreated the rest o f the 
states to join in its nullification o f the measure. Almost without exception, Virginia’s 
sister states responded with repugnance, admonishing the Old Dominion for what was 
commonly perceived as an attempt to undermine the stability o f the young nation. In 
response, James Madison, whose authorship o f the Resolutions would remain undisclosed 
for another quarter o f a century, drafted a report designed to justify Virginia’s position. 
The persuasive power o f the Report was exemplified by the frequency with which 
subsequent libertarian theorists, such as St. George Tucker and George Hay, adopted 
Madison’s arguments.36 Leonard Levy claims that “Madison’s exposition o f 1800 was 
not a reliable statement o f the understanding prevalent at the time o f the framing and 
ratification o f the First Amendment,” and is therefore inadmissible as evidence o f a 
libertarian definition of a free press existing before 1798. However, Levy fails to 
recognize that Madison’s Report reflects a philosophy publicly formulated throughout the 
revolutionary era, long before Congress approved the Sedition Act.
35 Madison, Virginia Report, 221-25. See Also, Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti- 
Federalists and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999), especially chap. 9; Levy, Legacy of Suppression, 273-82; and Jeffrey A. Smith, 
Printers and Press Freedom.
36 See St. George Tucker, “Of the Right of Conscience,” in Tucker’s Blackstone, 19-20; George 
Hay, Essays on the Liberty o f the Press.
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One o f the most important distinctions advanced by Madison’s Report concerns 
the differences between the balance o f  power in the British and American systems and 
the consequences o f those differences for the press. In the British government, legislators 
guarded their constituents’ rights against the danger o f encroachments by the executive 
magistrate and were therefore “exempt from distrust.” As Madison explained, “all the 
ramparts for protecting the rights o f [British] people, such as their magna charta, bill o f 
rights, etc., are not reared against the parliament, but against the royal prerogative.”
Under such a system, a protection from prior restraint, which traditionally was imposed 
by the king’s licensors, was all that publishers could expect to enjoy. The legislature 
maintained its right to penalize any behavior that lawmakers determined to be an abuse of 
the press. Conversely, the United States Constitution recognized that both the executive 
and the legislative branches o f government might violate the rights o f the people. In 
order to protect against this danger, Madison contended that the “security o f the freedom 
o f the press requires that it should be exempt, not only from previous restraint by the 
executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to 
be effectual, must be an exemption not only from the previous inspection o f licensers, but 
from the subsequent penalty o f laws.”37 Essentially, Madison believed that the 
framework o f government outlined in the Constitution had effectively repudiated the 
Blackstonian definition o f a free press, even if  the politicians who ratified the Bill o f  
Rights did not express a libertarian understanding o f the First Amendment when they 
debated its adoption. His position represented a fundamental change in American views
37 Madison, Virginia Report, 220.
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on the liberty o f the press that resulted directly from the practical accomplishments o f the 
Revolution.
Madison first began to articulate his theories regarding the unique role o f a free 
press in republican governments in a series o f essays that he composed for the National 
Gazette between 1791 and 1792. He intended for these compositions to address the issue 
o f maintaining a democratic republic in a large nation — an unresolved question that he 
had first addressed in the Federalist Papers?* In “Public Opinion,” which appeared in 
the National Gazette on December 19, 1791, Madison explained that ‘‘the larger a 
country, the less easy for its real opinion to be ascertained, and the less difficult to be 
counterfeited.” Naturally, this situation was “favorable to the authority o f the 
government” and “unfavorable to liberty.”39 O f course, an adequate expression o f public 
opinion was essential to encourage officers o f the government to remain responsible. 
Madison ultimately asserted that the unrestricted freedom of the press was the only 
means o f ensuring an effective articulation o f the will o f the citizenry in such an 
expansive republic. “Whatever facilitates a general intercourse o f sentiments” he 
professed, “as good roads, domestic commerce, a free press, and particularly a 
circulation o f  newspapers through the entire body o f the people ... is equivalent to a 
contraction o f territorial limits, and is favorable to liberty, where these may be too 
extensive.”40 While New England Federalists had long championed popular sovereignty 
as achieved through legislative debate, juries, and voting, Madison emphasized the
38 Cornell, Anti-Federalists, chap. 9.
39 James Madison, “Public Opinion,” December 17,1791, in Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds., The 
Papers o f James Madison, 17 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, and Charlottesville, Va.: The 
University Press of Virginia, 1962 - ) 14:170.
40 Ibid., emphasis original.
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necessity o f a vibrant print culture among these other mechanisms o f public vigilance. 
The fact that this argument grew out o f the Federalist Papers and achieved culmination 
in the Report on the State o f Virginia suggests that Madison’s response to the Sedition 
Act indicated a consolidation o f the libertarian definition of a free press, rather than the 
first “major step in the evolution o f the meaning o f the free speech-and-press clause,” as 
Levy claims.41 In addition to proposing that the proper exercise of republican 
government required unfettered freedom o f the press, Madison framed his argument in 
radical Whig ideology, drawing upon the incendiary impulses o f the Revolution.
The rhetoric that Madison employed to emphasize the importance o f public
opinion directly reflected the principles and fears that precipitated the Revolution and
prompted the establishment o f a new republican government. In a National Gazette
article published on January 18, 1792, he summarized the inspiration behind the
Revolution, and stressed the mechanisms necessary to preserve the accomplishments o f
that radical movement.
We look back, already with astonishment, at the daring outrages committed by 
despotism, on the reason and the rights o f man; We look forward with joy, to the 
period, when it shall be despoiled o f  all its usurpations, and bound forever in the 
chains, with which it had loaded its miserable victims.
In proportion to the value o f this revolution; in proportion to the 
importance o f its instruments [charters, constitutions, and bills o f rights], every 
word o f which decides a question o f power and liberty; in proportion to the 
solemnity o f acts, proclaiming the w ill, and authenticated by the seal o f the 
people, the only earthly source o f authority, ought to be the vigilance with which
41 Levy, Legacy o f Suppression, 282.
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they are guarded by every citizen in private life, and the circumspection with 
which they are executed by every citizen in public trust.42
This essay is crucial to our understanding of the origins o f a libertarian theory o f the 
freedom o f the press, because it places the importance o f private citizens’ vigilance over 
publicly elected officials — as expressed through the public print medium -  in the context 
o f the republican synthesis. Madison’s desire to secure an open press was directly related 
to the ideology that fueled the Revolution and his firm commitment to preserve the 
accomplishments of that conflict. In 1967, Bernard Bailyn argued that the patriots o f 
1776 viewed their cause as a struggle to protect liberty from the encroaching nature of 
power. According to the dissenting English tradition, which significantly informed 
America’s Revolutionary leaders, every political struggle resulted from an imbalance 
between liberty and power. Mankind in general was incapable o f resisting the 
temptations o f authority, whose necessary victim was liberty, and governments were 
therefore prone to corruption and tyranny. As Bailyn attests, “only in Britain -  and her 
colonies — had liberty emerged from its trials intact; only in Britain had the battle 
repeatedly been won. Yet even in Britain the margin o f victory had been narrow, 
especially in the last bitter struggle with the would-be despots o f the house o f Stuart.” 
Essentially, the leaders o f the American Revolution feared that the British government 
had grown corrupt and was conspiring to oppress them.43 As Gordon S. Wood has 
argued, these patriots consequently believed that they needed to establish a virtuous 
republic in order to escape the tyrannical fate o f so many civilizations throughout
42 James Madison, “Charters,” January 18, 1792, in Rutland et al., eds., Papers o f James Madison, 
14:191-92.
43 Bailyn, Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution, 79-80.
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history.44 Madison’s 1792 essay reveals that these modes o f thinking maintained a 
profound hold on American leaders, even after the Revolution. He celebrates the victory 
o f right and reason over despotism and confirms that the nation’s revolutionary 
documents have finally established an appropriate balance between the dichotomous 
extremes o f power and liberty. Furthermore, he contends that this balance will only be 
maintained through the vigilance o f the people: “How devoutly is it to be wished,” he 
concludes, “that the public opinion o f the United States should be enlightened.”45
Although English Whigs profoundly inspired Madison’s commitment to an 
enlightened public opinion, his influences were more international than previous 
historians have recognized. Recent scholarship by Colleen A. Sheehan reveals that “the 
idea of public opinion as a dominant political force did not originate with Madison.” 
Instead French theorists including Condorcet, Moreau, Jacques Necker, Jacques Peuchet, 
1’abbe Raynal, Turgot, Le Tronse, and others writing about “the reign of public opinion” 
throughout the 1780s, influenced Madison enough that their ideas and sometimes their 
exact phraseology appeared in his National Gazette essays.46 In particular, these men 
conveyed to Madison the crucial distinction between public and popular opinion. 
Distinguished men o f letters inform and maintain the public opinion, which is not easily 
agitated or altered. Conversely, popular opinion reflects the ephemeral passions o f the 
ignorant and desolate masses. As Sheehan illuminates, these French thinkers taught 
Madison that public opinion is a “complex and dynamic process o f social enlightenment”
44 Wood, Creation o f the American Republic.
45 James Madison, “Charters,” in Rutland, et al., eds, Papers o f James Madison, 14: 191-92.
46 Colleen A. Sheehan, “Madison and the French Enlightenment: The Authority of Public 
Opinion,” WMQ, 3d Ser., 59 (2002): 928, 932-33, n.23.
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that “transmits the ideas o f men o f letters to the common citizens via print.”47 This 
exclusive conception of public opinion as the responsibility o f the literati ultimately 
prevailed during the early years o f the American republic.
The deep influence that French philosophy maintained over early American 
leaders resonates in Gordon S. Wood’s 1974 article, “The Democratization o f Mind in 
the American Revolution.” Presaging many o f the arguments advanced in his 1992 
synthesis The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, Wood writes o f a brief time in the 
early Republic when “ideas and power, intellectualism and politics, came together . . .  in 
a way never again to be duplicated in American history.” National leaders believed in the 
dissemination o f opinion and information, but they restricted this discourse to “gentlemen 
talking to other gentlemen.” As John Randolph wrote in 1774, “When I mention the 
public, I mean only to include the rational part o f it. The ignorant vulgar are as unfit to 
judge o f the modes, as they are unable to manage the reins o f government.” Therefore, 
Wood contends, the public opinion that Madison championed in the early 1790s was “the 
intellectual product o f limited circles o f gentlemen-rulers.” It was the Sedition Act crisis, 
more than any other event, which undermined this elitist understanding o f public truth.
As countless ordinary and obscure men took up the pen and presumed to enlighten the 
people, they personally redefined public opinion as the creation o f diverse voices and 
ideas — none more legitimate than any other. As highly as modem Americans revere such
47 Sheehan, “Madison and the French Enlightenment,” 942-43.
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egalitarian advancements, this “democratization o f the American mind” created “a 
decline in the intellectual quality o f American political life” that Madison mourned.48
Indeed, most o f the significant scholarship relating to late-eighteenth-century 
public opinion confirms Wood’s and Sheehan’s rendering o f the public sphere as an 
exclusive milieu. As print historian David D. Hall explains, the Enlightenment ideal 
known as the “republic o f letters,” wherein all learned men actively exchanged 
knowledge in a mutual attempt to elevate humanity, was theoretically blind to 
“confessional, political, and national boundaries.” The viability o f  this republic depended 
on the circulation o f print media and, as Michael Warner confirms in his 1990 study 
Letters o f the Republic, the media strove to operate on a principle o f negativity, which 
“potentially legitimated the participation o f any class.” In other words, the impersonality 
o f the medium theoretically ensured that individuals could not be excluded from printed 
discourse on the basis o f “personality, faith, class, or other criteria o f validity.” In 
practice, however, few minorities gained access to the public arena. Print consumption 
remained the bailiwick o f propertied, white males, mainly “because the same differentials 
o f gender race and class allocated both citizenship . . .  and active literacy.” Hence, as 
Jurgen Habermas confirms in his seminal Structural Transformation o f the Public 
Sphere, the bourgeois public sphere that emerged briefly during the eighteenth century 
was revolutionary, but restricted to those qualified by property, education, and leisure to 
engage in public discourse. O f course this top-down conceptualization of public opinion,
48 Gordon S. Wood, “The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolution,” in Leadership in 
the American Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1974), 64, 71, 83. John Randolph’s 
Considerations on the Present State o f Virginia (n.p., 1774) is quoted by Wood on page 67.
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deplorable as it may seem by today’s standards, did not necessarily negate Madison’s 
libertarian commitment to an open press.49
It is important at this juncture to acknowledge the difference between free 
expression and the formation o f public opinion in Madison’s political theory. Although 
Madison championed an open press, which embraced the quantity and diversity o f public 
opinions, his larger expectation was that these various expressions would compete for 
legitimacy within the public sphere and, in a very Darwinian sense, only the most 
reasoned sentiments would prevail. Therefore, supporting the freedom of the press, 
discerning truth and reason within the maelstrom o f opinions such freedom engenders, 
and then shaping informed public opinion and subsequent policies accordingly are 
separate steps in the larger process o f public discourse. To value informed and rational 
opinions above impassioned public outbursts in and o f itself is neither elitist nor 
exclusionary. The problem is that Madison and his political allies tended to employ 
undemocratic and elitist criteria — often to their own detriment — in determining who was 
best able to reason about matters o f public concern.50
Following the French example, Madison and his colleagues recognized the need 
to recruit men o f sound character and information to act as the engineers o f American 
public opinion. In 1791, when Madison and Jefferson resolved to employ a Republican
49 David D. Hall, “Learned Culture in the Eighteenth Century,” in Hugh Amory and David D.
Hall, eds., The History o f the Book in America, Volume Oner The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World 
(Worcester, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 416; Michael Warner, The Letters o f the Republic: 
Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1990), 48.
501 would like to thank Christopher Grasso, a member of my thesis committee, for highlighting the 
differences between Madison’s support of free expression and his understanding of the formation of public 
opinion. Professor Grasso suggested the Darwinian reading of Federalist No. 10 after reading an early 
draft of this thesis.
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man o f letters to create and manage an official party organ, they demonstrated 
disturbingly nativist and elitist tendencies. Jeffrey L. Pasley reports that “not only did 
they look outside the trade for an editor, they insisted on a man of education and 
established reputation.”51 They regarded their crusade to enlighten the people too highly 
to settle for a conventional party journalist: a stereotypically uneducated, unrefined, 
artisan printer, who, more often than not, had immigrated to the United States in order to 
escape prosecution under Britain’s stringent press regulations.52 Instead, Madison and 
Jefferson selected Philip Freneau. An eminent American with an established reputation 
as the “Poet o f the Revolution,” Freneau was the safe choice, and he stepped tentatively 
into the world o f publishing when he launched the National Gazette at the Vice 
President’s request. Ironically, the lower class emigre writers rejected as uneducated and 
unrefined were probably as capable — if  not more so -  o f advancing radical Whig 
rhetoric. These artisans were experts o f their trade who had perfected the art o f political 
journalism while participating in Great Britain’s radical opposition, yet they were 
precisely the sort o f men that Madison and Jefferson deemed unqualified to disseminate 
public opinion. Despite Madison’s inability to recognize and overcome the elitism o f his 
own philosophy -  a flaw which will be addressed at length in the following chapter -  he 
remained among the most ardent advocates, in word and in deed, o f the most libertarian 
definition o f a free press that Americans had ever known.
51 Pasley, Tyranny o f Printers, 63.
52 For information regarding the massive influx of emigre printers into the United States in the 
early 1790s, see the work of Michael Durey. In particular, “Thomas Paine’s Apostles: Radical Emigres and 
the Triumph of Jeffersonian Republicanism, ” WMQ, 3d Ser., 44 (1987), and Transatlantic Radicals.
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In an addition to writing essays for the National Gazette, Madison acted to defend 
the importance o f free expression by protesting the prosecution o f U.S. Representative 
Samuel Jordan Cabell o f Albemarle, Virginia. In 1797 the Circuit Court o f Richmond 
summoned Cabell before a grand jury because he had distributed a circular letter among 
his constituents that viciously condemned the policies of the Adams administration. 
Madison joined Thomas Jefferson in drafting a petition to the state legislature that 
characterized the presentment o f the court as “a violation o f the fundamental principles o f 
representation . . .  an usurpation o f power . . .  and a subjection o f a natural right o f 
speaking and writing freely.”53 As historians Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon have 
argued, Madison and Jefferson viewed the court’s action as a violation o f the proper 
relationship between constituents and their representatives, and consequently became 
concerned about the opposition’s attempts to silence Republican criticism on the eve o f a 
national election.54 Considering Madison’s belief that public censure o f elected officials 
sustained the viability o f an extended republic, it is easy to understand why the case 
against Cabell alarmed him. I f  citizens — whether public or private — could not scrutinize 
the policies o f their leaders, especially as the nation approached a crucial election year, 
then the integrity o f the representative republic would not hold.
Clearly, Federalist maneuvers had already aroused Madison’s concern by the time 
the Sedition Act passed a year later. As Koch and Ammon demonstrate, the petition of 
1797 and the Virginia Resolutions were a part o f the same overarching campaign to
53 Petition quoted in Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: 
An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of American Civil Liberties” WMQ, 3d Ser., 5 (1948): 
153.
54 Ibid.
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preserve American civil liberties. In fact, when viewed in conjunction with the National 
Gazette essays, Madison’s political tactics in 1797-1800 fit into an even broader 
progression o f political theory than Koch and Ammon have recognized. The Cabell 
petition, the Virginia Resolutions, and the Report on the State o f Virginia collectively 
represent the completion of a theory that began to develop during the Revolution and in 
its immediate aftermath.
St. George Tucker is yet another Virginian whose philosophy advanced 
libertarian free press ideology. One o f the nation’s foremost legal scholars when 
Congress passed the Sedition Act, Tucker studied law under George Wythe and rose to 
prominence as one o f the Old Dominion’s most distinguished judges. Eventually, he 
succeeded his mentor as professor o f law at the College o f William and Mary. Tucker’s 
encyclopedic knowledge o f English common law earned him a reputation as “the 
American Blackstone.” After Independence, he undertook the awesome task o f 
annotating Blackstone’s Commentaries to reflect the changes necessitated by the creation 
of a republican government. This five volume work, entitled Blackstone’s 
Commentaries: With Notes o f Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, o f the Federal 
Government o f the United States; and o f the Commonwealth o f Virginia, would have 
occupied a prominent place on the bookshelf o f  every lawyer in the state. Consequently, 
Tucker exploited the ubiquitous influence o f his work by appending to it several 
politically charged essays. While Tucker’s Blackstone did not receive publication until
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two years after the sedition law expired, it nevertheless demonstrated a pre-Revolutionary 
emergence o f a libertarian theory o f the freedom of the press.55
Like Madison, Tucker framed most o f his arguments in the same Enlightenment 
and radical Whig vocabulary that had propelled the Revolution, thereby rooting his 
philosophy in 1776. This rhetorical style is most apparent in an appendix to his edition of 
Blackstone, entitled “O f the Right o f Conscience; and o f the Freedom o f Speech and the 
Press,” which dealt with both freedom o f religious expression and freedom of the press.
In this essay, Tucker referred to the general right o f personal opinion as “one o f those 
absolute rights which man hath received from the immediate gift o f his Creator, but 
which the policy o f all governments, from the first institution o f society to the foundation 
o f the American republics hath endeavored to restrain in some mode or other.”56 In this 
brief statement, Tucker referred to both the inalienable rights o f natural law and the 
radical Whig belief that all governments inevitably tend toward tyranny and oppression. 
Hence, the jurist addressed two concepts that Bailyn identifies among the driving ideas o f
55 In an unpublished paper entitled “St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, and 
American Print in the Early National Period,” (College of William and Mary, 1998), Kevin Butterfield 
observed that Tucker began seeking a publisher for his edition of Blackstone as early as 1794. This 
discovery might refute Levy’s claim that none of the major libertarian treatises on the liberty of the press 
appeared before 1798. However, Butterfield admits that “there is no indication that Tucker provided the 
publisher, William Tatham, with much information beyond a very basic description of the proposed layout 
of the work.” Indeed, while Tatham mentions reading a “preface,” he most likely reviewed a prospectus 
for what he later refers to as Tucker’s “contemplated work.” Indeed, there is no evidence that “the notes 
and appendices . . .  were almost all completed” at this juncture, as Butterfield suggests. Furthermore, in 
February 1798 Tucker composed a “Memo of Proposal to M. L. Weems for Publishing Blackstone’s 
Commentaries,” which outlined his appendices in great detail. The proposal, written five months before 
the inception of the Sedition Law, does not mention the essay “Of the Right of Conscience,” which 
ultimately appeared in the appendix to the fourth volume of Tucker’s edition. Therefore, although Tucker 
attempted to engage five different firms to publish his work between 1794 and 1802, the evidence suggests 
that Tucker added the essay on freedom of thought and expression after the passage of the Sedition Law. 
See William Tatham to St. George Tucker, 26 and 30 January 1795, and St. George Tucker, “Memo of 
Proposal to M. L. Weems for Publishing Blackstone’s Commentaries,” 14 February 1798, Tucker-Coleman 
Papers.
56 Tucker, “Of the Right of Conscience,” in Tucker’s Blackstone, 4: 3.
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the Revolution. Furthermore, Tucker asserted that thought and speech represented 
different manifestations o f the same personal opinion and that each required equal 
protection under the law. As the blessings o f the Creator, “they ought. . .  to have been 
wholly exempt from the coercion o f human laws in all speculative and doctrinal points 
whatsoever.”57 Tucker believed that because these liberties originated from the same 
source, a legislature that could undermine the liberty o f the press could also justify 
abridging freedom o f religion. He was not alone in this fear.
Madison had also expressed concern in his Report that any denigration o f the 
freedom o f expression might weaken religious freedom. Pointing out that these similar 
liberties were secured by the same constitutional amendment, Madison explained, “i f  it 
be admitted that the extent o f the freedom o f the press, secured by the amendment, is to 
be measured by the common law on this subject, the same authority may be resorted to, 
for the standard which is to fix the extent o f ‘freedom o f religion.’”58 As it is completely 
unreasonable to assume that the founders intended to endorse English common law 
standards regarding religious practices, it is equally absurd to assert that they meant to 
codify the Blackstonian definition o f a free press when they adopted the First 
Amendment.59 Ultimately, the concepts o f religious and expressive freedom were closely 
linked under the umbrella o f natural rights philosophy, and libertarian thinkers believed 
that the instruments created to protect the former from encroachments o f power also 
applied to the latter. I f  one accepts this argument, then one must necessarily
57 Ibid., 12.
58 Madison, The Virginia Report, 229.
59 James Morton Smith draws on Hay, Madison, and Tucker, among others, to suggest this 
argument in Freedom’s Fetters, 429.
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acknowledge that Virginians, at least, repudiated the common law view o f a free press 
prior to the passage o f the Sedition Act.
The Virginia Act Establishing Religious Freedom, adopted in 1785, rejected the 
bad tendency test that was essential to determining the criminality o f seditious libel. Like 
Tucker’s appendix essay, the act referred to personal opinion in a general sense. “To 
suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the fie ld  o f opinion,” the act 
proclaimed, “and to restrain the profession or propagation o f principles on supposition o f 
their ill tendency, is a dangerous falacy [s/c.].”60 This broad characterization allows one 
to infer the ideological rejection o f the bad tendency test for all forms o f conscientious 
expression, including political opinions. Referring particularly to the statute concerning 
religious freedom, Leonard Levy admits, “in Virginia . . .  there is a basis for the 
presumption that the common law o f criminal libel was meant to be superseded by the 
protection afforded to the freedoms o f religion and the press.” However, Levy ultimately 
rejects this thesis, because “in context, only freedom o f religion is provided for and 
explicitly named.”61 Nevertheless, as previously shown, libertarian theory held that 
freedom o f religious belief was inextricably connected to freedom of speech and o f the 
press. Therefore, Virginians relied upon natural rights philosophy, which had in large 
part inspired their involvement in the American Revolution, to negate the bad tendency 
test, and thereby renounce the Blackstonian concept o f seditious libel. Furthermore, 
Enlightenment thought did not provide the only Revolutionary basis for the libertarians’ 
rejection o f the bad tendency principle.
60 Preamble to the Virginia Act Establishing Religious Freedom quoted in James Morton Smith, 
Freedom s Fetters, 428, emphasis added; see also pages 428-29.
61 Levy, Legacy o f Suppression, 189.
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St. George Tucker’s argument against the Sedition Act arose from an important 
connection between the English radical Whig tradition and the American Revolution. In 
order to understand this fact, it is important to recognize that the common law crime of 
seditious libel did not emerge from legal tradition; rather, Sir Robert Coke introduced it 
into the corpus o f English law as part o f a decision handed down by the Court o f the Star 
Chamber in 1606. Charles I ’s prerogative court constituted one o f the royal 
infringements o f elite privileges that inspired radical Englishmen to raise arms against the 
king during the mid seventeenth century. However, as Jeffrey A. Smith explains,
“instead o f dying with the Star Chamber in 1641 or with the Glorious Revolution, [the 
logic o f seditious libel] was subsequently held by English authorities as valid, and the 
precedent was applied in cases involving the growing and increasingly troublesome 
periodical press.”62 In this sense, the crime o f seditious libel represented a remnant of 
past oppression that the English Civil War had failed to eliminate. It remained 
entrenched in the body o f common law despite the fact that men had died in the effort to 
abolish the political entity that first condoned it. Furthermore, as Bailyn argues, few o f 
England’s Whigs accepted the accomplishments o f the Civil War and the Glorious 
Revolution as a complete defeat o f government corruption. They viewed policies such as 
the prosecution o f seditious libel and government interference in the practice o f religion 
as vestiges o f an oppressive past, and their radical advocacy for reform inspired the 
patriots o f 1776 to challenge the corrupting force o f English tyranny.63 Therefore, 
Tucker’s libertarian definition o f  a free press did not develop as an immediate response to
62 Jeffrey A. Smith, Printers and Press Freedom, 60.
63 Bailyn, Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution, 46-7.
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the rancorous party struggles o f the 1790s. Rather, it reached far back into the English 
past and addressed the unfinished business o f no less than three radical revolutions 
designed to halt the natural encroachment o f power upon liberty.
Tucker’s frequent references to the Star Chamber Court, which appear in his
annotation o f Blackstone’s Commentaries as well the appended essays, reveal his
intellectual connection to England’s radical Whigs. As a general rule, Tucker only
amended Blackstone’s text with clinical notations of American variations on the law.
However, when the British jurist introduced the concepts o f seditious libel and bad
tendency, the American inserted an ideological footnote designed for drama and effect.
“The general rules laid down by the court o f the Star Chamber,” Tucker warns his
readers, “are either extrajudicial or not maintained . . . .  When we consider the source
from whence these doctrines have been brought to us, the reasonableness of them ought
to be examined before we yield our full assent to all o f them.”64 In Tucker’s mind, the
reasonableness o f these principles had indeed been examined and ultimately rejected by
the first settlers o f the American colonies and the patriots o f 1776. In his appendix essay,
he asserted that the fundamental principle o f unrestricted press freedom was:
generated in the American mind, by an abhorrence o f the maxims and principles 
o f that government which they had shaken off, and a detestation o f the 
abominable persecutions, and extrajudicial dogmas, o f the still odious court o f 
the star-chamber; whose tyrannical proceedings and persecutions, among other 
motives o f the like nature, prompted and impelled our ancestors to fly from the 
pestilential government o f their native country, to seek an asylum here; where 
they might enjoy, and their prosperity establish, and transmit to all future 
generations, freedom, unshackled, unlimited, and undefined. That in our time we
64 Tucker’s Blackstone, 4: 150; see note 19.
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have vindicated, fought for, and established that freedom by our arms, and made 
it the solid, and immovable basis and foundation both o f the state, and federal 
government.65
Tucker’s prose reveals that he was primarily concerned with maintaining the libertarian 
tradition that originated in the seventeenth century and fueled America’s own Revolution. 
Contrary to Levy’s analysis, Tucker rejected the Sedition Act because it represented a 
recurrence o f the oppression that he believed the Revolution had sought to eliminate.
This work appeared after 1798 because that was when the recurrence first became 
apparent, not because the Sedition Act encouraged him to develop a politically expedient 
definition o f the freedom of the press.
Tucker believed that the majority o f his countrymen shared his conviction and had 
declared so through the ratification of the Constitution. Indicating that the instrument of 
national government secured the unfettered freedom o f the press, he asserted that ‘"the 
people o f America have always manifested a most jealous sensibility on the subject o f 
this inestimable right, and have ever regarded it as a fundamental principle in their 
government, and carefully engrafted it in their Constitution.”66 For Tucker and other 
libertarian thinkers, the codification o f the freedom o f the press in the First Amendment 
was an incontrovertible rejection of the doctrine o f seditious libel. However, as Levy 
questions the validity o f  this claim, it bears mentioning that not every argument against 
the constitutionality o f the Sedition Act was derived from the Bill o f Rights. This fact is
65 Tucker, “Of the Right of Conscience,” in Tucker’s Blackstone, 4: 16.
66 Ibid.
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best illustrated by the arguments advanced by a promising young attorney by the name o f 
George Hay.
Like St. George Tucker, Hay was one o f Virginia’s brightest legal minds. Later 
to serve as Attorney General during the administration o f his father-in-law, James 
Monroe, Hay defended the only man to stand trial for seditious libel in the state o f 
Virginia.67 His Essay on the Liberty o f the Press, published in 1799 under the 
pseudonym Hortentius, earned him a reputation as the nation’s most liberal champion o f 
the First Amendment. In most respects, Hay’s essay conveyed the same essential 
arguments involved in the writings o f Madison and Tucker to a more general audience.
He reiterated the belief that open criticism of public officers was essential in a 
representative republic, rejected the relevancy o f the bad tendency clause, and 
condemned the Sedition Act for its basis in a defunct system o f government that was 
widely recognized to have sacrificed liberty for power. Most importantly, he questioned 
how anyone could seek to revive the policies o f this rejected government when the 
leaders o f the American Revolution had created political documents specifically designed 
to prevent this eventuality.68
Hay argued that the founding leaders o f Virginia had taken steps expressly 
calculated to check the struggle between the forces o f power and liberty. The document 
submitted to Congress by Virginia’s ratifying convention in 1788 expressed the Old 
Dominion’s reservations regarding the national Constitution. Asserting that ‘‘the doctrine
67 See David Robertson, ed., The Trial o f James Thompson Callender, for Sedition, on Tuesday the 
Third Day o f June, 1800, in the Middle Circuit Court at Richmond, in the District o f Virginia (Petersburg, 
Va., 1804); James Mortem Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, chap. 15; Durey, Hammer of Truth.
68 Hay, Essays on the Liberty o f the Press.
47
of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and 
destructive o f the good and happiness o f mankind,” the convention adopted Whig 
rhetoric and demanded that the first Congress to assemble under the new Constitution 
enact “a Declaration or Bill o f  Rights asserting and securing from encroachment the 
essential and unalienable Rights o f the People.”69 The leaders o f Virginia, who were 
certainly not alone in demanding such additional protections, recognized that the new 
Constitution had not gone far enough in codifying the advances that the Revolution had 
wrought in the ongoing struggle to find balance between liberty and power. As Hay 
observed, they knew “that it has frequently happened in the course o f human affairs, and 
may again happen, that the individuals thus selected [to administer the government] may 
abuse the power entrusted to them.”70
Virginians recognized that the best defense against government corruption was to 
mandate that “the people have a right to freedom of speech, and o f writing and publishing 
their Sentiments,” because “the freedom o f the press is one o f the greatest bulwarks o f 
liberty.”71 Indeed, only a press free from all congressional jurisdiction — including both 
prior restraint and subsequent punishment -  would allow open examination o f public 
officials, ensure responsible government, and halt the natural transgressions o f power. 
Virginians clearly viewed the principles eventually enshrined in the First Amendment as 
an essential component o f the Revolution’s Whiggish victory over the corrupting 
tendencies o f government. Therefore, they made their approval o f the Constitution
69 For Virginia’s Ratifying Document, see Charles C. Tansill, ed., Documents Illustrative o f the 
Formation o f the Union o f the American States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927), 
1028.
70 Hay, Essays on the Liberty o f the Press, 5.
71 Tansill, ed., Documents Illustrative o f the Formation o f the Union, 1030.
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contingent upon the adoption o f a Bill o f  Rights, which would act as a binding 
culmination o f the ideological impulses that had led them through the rebellion. In this 
sense, the Virginia ratifying document confirms the intention o f repudiating Blackstone 
prior to 1798. In Hay’s mind, this fact alone should have justified the nullification o f the 
Sedition Act. Nevertheless, he had an even more fundamental Constitutional argument 
prepared for those Federalists who claimed it did not.
Hay based his rejection o f the Sedition Act on three basic tenets found in the main 
text o f the Constitution: all power originally belongs to the people, powers o f government 
are granted by the people, and individuals selected from the mass o f people possess no 
powers not expressly granted. This final point does not apply to state governments, 
which are considered to be the guardians o f their citizens’ rights, and are therefore vested 
with general powers, “except those specifically denied.” Conversely, the federal 
government exists because, in an expansive republic, there are certain areas that state 
legislatures cannot effectively administer; hence “specific powers only are given.” 
Therefore, in order to determine the constitutionality o f a congressional law, one need 
only ask, “Is the power to pass this law expressly granted to Congress?” In the case of 
the Sedition Act, the answer was negative, thus voiding the measure.
Furthermore, Hay acknowledged the arguments advanced by Federalist members 
o f Congress that the preamble’s Common Defense and General Welfare clause, later 
echoed in Article I, Section 8, gave Congress province to regulate the press. However, he 
countered that the preamble shows intention and is not a part o f the law, and that Article 
I, Section 8 is “not a general power to provide for the good o f the nation, but a special 
power o f laying and collecting taxes and duties for the purpose of providing for the
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general welfare.” Truthfully, the Constitution never grants Congress the power -  explicit 
or implicit — to control the press through subsequent punishment. Therefore, the United 
States Constitution, through its silence, repudiated Blackstone’s limited definition o f the 
freedom o f the press.72
Collectively, the treatises o f James Madison, St. George Tucker, and George Hay 
demonstrate that a libertarian definition o f freedom o f the press was based on 
Revolutionary principles and grew to fruition during the Sedition Act crisis and in its 
immediate aftermath. These men expressed a belief in the freedom of the press that was 
closely related to the radical Whig tradition and the Enlightenment thought that animated 
the American Revolution. Furthermore, they understood that the radical and innovative 
nature of the government outlined in and protected by the Constitution and its Bill o f 
Rights created a need to reconsider the traditions and precedents handed down by 
centuries o f English jurists. Indeed, seditious libel was only one o f many English 
common law principles rendered obsolete by the creation o f the American republic. 
Therefore, the Republicans’ reaction to the Sedition Act o f 1798 was, above all, an 
attempt to preserve the practical accomplishments o f the American Revolution.
Ho wever, as the struggle to control interpretations o f the American Revolution 
constituted one o f the most divisive aspects o f the late eighteenth century’s partisan wars, 
it is easy to understand why many scholars have come to characterize the Sedition Act 
debate in a simplistic manner. Nevertheless, Virginia’s defenders o f freedom believed 
that the unrestricted liberty o f the press was a fundamental component for any society 
that wished to avoid the inevitable slide into corruption and tyranny. At no time was this
72 Hay, Essays on the Liberty o f the Press, 7, 10.
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more apparent than when Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase personally carried the 
odious sedition law into the Old Dominion-
CHAPTER II
THE CAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE MARTYRDOM OF JAMES THOMSON CALLENDER
“True genius is almost always sans-culotte.” — Henri Gregoire
On the third day o f June 1800, James Thomson Callender became the first and only man 
to be tried for the crime o f seditious libel in the state o f Virginia or anywhere in the 
American South. His case is instructive for several reasons. Primarily, among the 
several publishers indicted under the Sedition Act, Callender alone challenged the 
constitutionality o f the measure as the basis o f his defense. His legal team -  comprised 
o f the best and brightest litigators the Old Dominion had to offer -  was organized by 
Governor Monroe and Vice President Jefferson, and funded by citizens’ contributions. 
Furthermore, Jefferson and his acolytes understood that “it is useful to furnish occasions 
for the flame o f public opinion to break out from time to time,” and so they orchestrated 
Callender’s trial to create a political coup de theatre on the eve o f an imperative national 
election. Their Federalist adversaries were no different, viewing the case against 
Callender as an opportunity to make a show of federal authority in the recalcitrant South. 
Indeed, the journalist himself had very little relevance to the trial that would decide his 
fate.1
Callender’s marginality in the discussion o f his own supposed crime reveals 
something very important about the state o f free press ideology at the end o f the 
eighteenth century. He did not unwittingly fall victim to the machinations o f the
1 The quote is Jefferson’s, from a letter written to Monroe shortly before Callender’s indictment 
for seditious libel. Jefferson to Madison, 16 March 1800, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress.
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politicians he wrote about; in feet, he relished his role as a martyr to the Republican 
cause. However, the encouragement and patronage he received while writing The 
Prospect Before Us, the object o f his indictment, and the very real abandonment he 
experienced upon incarceration signify that restrictive eighteenth-century definitions o f 
public opinion continued to guide the policy o f  early American leaders. Callender, a 
lifelong publicist for the radical Whig tradition, fled Scotland and an indictment of 
seditious libel in the mid-1790s. Almost immediately, his incendiary articles and 
pamphlets captured the attention o f Thomas Jefferson, who recognized Callender’s 
capacity to inspire discontent with the Adams administration. His convictions and hard- 
earned experience as a party hack made him an expedient choice as a mouthpiece for the 
Republican opposition. However, once the Revolution o f 1800 passed and the 
Jeffersonians found themselves safely entrenched, Callender’s utility came to an end. He 
simply did not fit the accepted definition o f a gentleman-joumalist, whose intellect and 
refinement could safely guide the enlightened public opinion. Ultimately, Callender’s 
case demonstrates that early Virginians regarded the Sedition Act as a direct violation o f  
their well-developed idea o f an open press, although they maintained a very classist and 
nativist idea about who was best qualified to employ that freedom.
The approval o f the Sedition Act was particularly dangerous for James Thomson 
Callender. When the measure passed, he was writing for the incendiary Philadelphia 
Aurora, whose editor, Benjamin Franklin Bache, already languished in prison under a 
legally tenuous common law indictment o f  seditious libel.2 Many observers, including
2 The question of whether or not the federal government possessed the right to enforce common 
law doctrines remained in doubt until 1812, when the Supreme Court established that every crime against
53
Thomas Jefferson, believed that Callender was “a principle object o f [the law].” Wisely, 
Callender took steps to ensure his own security. On June 4, 1798, he became a 
naturalized citizen o f the United States, understanding that he could thereby avoid the 
threat o f the Alien Act. Then, declaring, “I cannot think I should be safe in Philadelphia, 
as soon as I shall be in Richmond,” Callender accepted the invitation o f Senator Thomas 
Stevens Mason to take refuge at his Virginia estate, Raspberry Plains. To Callender, 
Virginia was a safe haven, where he enjoyed the protection o f state Republicans, whose 
local dominance rendered a federal indictment o f seditious libel unlikely. He arrived at 
Mason’s Loudon County estate in July 1798, feeling defeated and battle-weary.3
During his early months in Virginia, Callender expressed a strong aversion to his 
chosen profession and a feeling that the Philadelphia Republicans had neglected him in 
his hour o f need. “I am entirely sick even o f the Republicans,” he declared, “I have been 
so severely cheated, and so often, that I have the strongest inclination, as well as the best 
reason, for wishing to shift the scene.” He had suffered many great trials in 1798, 
including the death o f his wife and threats o f prosecution, deportation, and assassination. 
He talked endlessly about establishing himself in a more honorable profession, outside o f 
politics, and dreamed o f someday taking his sons back to Scotland. According to 
Callender’s biographer, Michael Durey, the radical Scotsman “reverted to his customary 
philosophy o f suspicion o f all groups, conceding trust to only select individuals.” For
the United States required a federal statute. Therefore, the Adams administration initiated proceedings 
against Benjamin Franklin Bache and John Daly Burk before Congress even passed the Sedition Act. See 
James Mortem Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, chap. 10.
3 Jefferson to Monroe, Philadelphia, 7 June 1798, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings o f  
Thomas Jefferson, 10 vols. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892-99), 7: 143; Callender to Jefferson, 19 
November, 1798, in Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., “Thomas Jefferson and James Thomson Callender,” 
New England Historical and Genealogical Register, 51 (1896): 331-33.
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nearly a year, he lived quietly in the seclusion generously provided by Senator Mason, 
before slowly regaining his vivacity and will to engage in political turmoil.4
When Callender left Loudon County for Richmond in May 1799, he discovered 
an intricate support network in place among Republican officials and party journalists. 
Meriwether Jones, a former member o f the Virginia House o f Delegates and personal 
friend o f Thomas Jefferson, had recently resigned his position on the state Executive 
Council in order to accept the role o f printer to the Commonwealth. Ancillary to his 
official duties, Jones undertook the editorship of the Richmond Examiner, one o f the 
leading Republican newspapers o f the time, and welcomed Callender’s contributions as a 
writer. James Lyon, son o f the infamous Congressman from Vermont, came to Virginia 
only after Callender agreed to join him in the publication o f the National Magazine, an 
experimental collection o f the best Republican articles for regular national distribution. 
Callender fit easily into this cooperative association o f politicians and printers, and 
moved confidently forward on a project he had conceived sometime during the fall o f the 
previous year.5
The decision to write The Prospect Before Us had prompted Callender’s move 
from Northern Virginia to Richmond. Late in 1798, he began to feel that the time had 
come to renew his campaign against the Federalist Party in general and the Sedition Act 
in particular. He confided in Jefferson his plan to publish a political volume from 
Richmond, believing that “no judge in this state will, by that time, dare to raise a process
4 Callender to Jefferson, 22 September 1798, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” 
NEHGR, 51 (1896): 328-29; Durey,. With the Hammer o f Truth, 110.
5 For information on Callender’s move to Richmond and employment there, see Durey, With the 
Hammer o f Truth, 116-17.
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of sedition.” He felt certain that the tide was turning in the Republicans’ favor. “By next 
March,” he reasoned, “the public mind will be much riper than it is at present for the 
admission o f truth.” Callender appreciated that if he paid careful attention to political 
currents and employed his vitriolic pen at precisely the right moment, he could personally 
influence the course o f public opinion. In this sense, he played as important a role in 
engineering his trial as the Republicans and Federalists who each wanted to make an 
example o f him in their own way. There is no doubt that when Callender emerged from 
the solitude of Raspberry Plains that spring, he stepped willingly back into the fray o f 
partisan journalism. The more compelling question is, what aroused a relatively craven 
man, who twice before had fled the scepter o f prosecution and frequently professed an 
ardent desire to exit politics forever, eagerly to defy the national government?6
O f course, there is more than one explanation for Callender’s abnormal degree o f 
confidence. His erroneous conviction that Virginia was beyond the reach o f the federal 
judiciary certainly encouraged his bravado. He also understood that the Federalist Party 
was undermining its own authority by enforcing the increasingly unpopular Sedition Act. 
As he wrote to fellow Republican printer William Duane after the publication o f The 
Prospect Before Us, “the more violence, the more prosecutions from the treasury, so 
much the better.” Believing that each new indictment brought the Federalists closer to 
collapse, Callender grew eager to deal a deathblow to the ruling party. “[The trials] o f 
yourself and [English emigre printer Thomas] Cooper will be o f service,” he reminded 
Duane. “You know the old ecclesiastical observation, that the blood o f  the martyrs was
6 Callender to Jefferson, 19 November 1798, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” 
NEHGR, 51 (1896): 331-33.
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the seed o f  the c h u r c h In spite of these noble sentiments, it remains rather unlikely that 
Callender, a man accustomed to running from the trouble his writing created, would so 
willingly have made himself vulnerable if he truly believed that the rising Republicans 
would abandon him to suffer the consequences o f his martyrdom. In fact, he informed St. 
George Tucker from his desolate cell in Richmond Jail that he had been assured that “in 
the event o f a trial and sentence upon that statute [the Sedition Act],” the judges of 
Virginia “would by their own authority, dismiss the prisoner from jail,” and he later 
admitted to Madison, “I had no more idea o f mean usage than that mountains were to 
dance a minuet.”7
Indeed, Callender’s bluster flowed from a source unrelated to the Federalists’ 
foreseeable ruin. As Durey explains, the Scotsman’s vigorous return to the political 
arena had more to do with his very personal correspondence with Thomas Jefferson. On 
a 1797 sojourn to Philadelphia, the Vice President asked a mutual friend to introduce him 
to the author o f The Political Progress o f  Britain, a piece that Jefferson praised publicly. 
Their communication flowered significantly after Callender fled to Virginia. Although 
the majority o f their missives originated with the exiled journalist, Jefferson’s few replies 
exuded what Durey calls “the unqualified impression of the Republican leader’s need o f 
[Callender] to continue the battle against Federalism.” The Vice President reviewed page 
proofs o f Prospect as Callender produced them, reminded the writer how important his 
work was to the cause o f liberty, and offered him significant financial support. This 
endorsement gave Callender a sense o f imperviousness that was so uncharacteristic,
7 Callender to William Duane, 27 April 1800, in ibid., 451-52; Callender to Tucker, 4 November 
1800, Tucker-Coleman Papers; Callender to Madison, 27 April 1801, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and 
Callender,” NEHGR 52 (1897): 153-54.
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Durey doubts whether Callender would ever have published The Prospect Before Us 
without. Jefferson’s active mentorship. In later years, Jefferson would adamantly deny 
that his dealings with Callender ever exceeded gentlemanly charity. He professed to have 
given Callender “such aids as I could afford, merely as a man o f  genius suffering under 
persecution, and not as a writer o f our politics.” In reality, Jefferson’s actions belied such
o
ardent protestations.
Throughout the party wars o f the 1790s, Jefferson and his cohorts displayed an 
indisputable predilection to pay for the pen. A prime example o f this habit occurred 
when Madison and Jefferson implored Philip Freneau to spearhead the National Gazette 
in 1791, simultaneously presenting him with an unsolicited position as a State 
Department translator. According to then-Secretary o f State Jefferson, this salaried post 
gave “so little to do as not to interfere with any other calling the person may chuse.” As 
an additional perk, Jefferson promised to send Freneau all o f  the State Department’s 
printing business. The Virginians clearly provided monetary compensation for Freneau’s 
contributions to the Republican cause, demonstrating a policy that remained unchanged 
on the eve o f Callender’s ordeal. “We are sensible that this summer is the season for 
systematic energies and sacrifices,” Jefferson wrote to Madison in February 1799. “The 
engine is the press. Every man must lay his purse and his pen under contribution.” 
Jefferson understood that good publicity fueled the rising wave o f popularity which 
promised to carry the Republicans to national prominence. Not only was he willing to 
empty his own pockets for a bit o f  old fashioned media hype, he had no chivalrous
8 Durey, With the Hammer o f Truth, 113, 120; Jefferson to Monroe, 15 July 1802, in W. C. Ford, 
ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” 52 (1897): 157-58; Jefferson to Monroe, 29 May 1801, in ibid., 156-57.
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qualms about entreating others to do the same. Indeed, Callender ranked among the 
many gifted journalists verily employed as advocates o f Jefferson’s politics.9
Although Jefferson later characterized his subscriptions to Callender’s works as a 
“pretext to cover a mere charity,” closer examination reveals that the Vice President’s 
contributions were hardly so innocuous. In fact, Jefferson’s two largest donations to 
Callender immediately followed letters in which the journalist expressed an intention to 
cease his efforts. Settling into the sanctuary o f Raspberry Plains, Callender explained, “it 
is needless, even were it safe, to write anymore. The [Federalist] party are doing their 
own business as fast as can be.” Feeling unnecessarily exposed to danger as an 
incendiary journalist, Callender implored Jefferson to help him secure employment as a 
schoolmaster or storekeeper. In response, Jefferson offered sympathy, support, and fifty 
dollars, gently reminding Callender of his “power to render services to the public 
liberty.” Then, in August 1799 an unruly group calling themselves the Richmond 
Associators seriously shook Callender’s confidence by threatening to riot and drive him 
out o f town. “While I am in danger o f being murthered without doors,” he told Jefferson, 
“I do not find within them any particular encouragement to proceed. I shall therefore 
probably cease from writing.” Jefferson again sent his protege fifty dollars, assuring him 
that his writing “[could not] fail to produce the best effect” and “inform the thinking part 
o f the nation.” Not only are these contributions conspicuous for their appearance 
whenever Callender’s commitment began to wane, they are positively staggering in size. 
Prior to 1799 Jefferson had never delivered more than sixteen dollars to Callender, with
9 Jefferson to Freneau, 28 February 1791, in Julian P. Boyd, et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, 29 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950 - ), 19: 351, cited in Pasley, 
Tyranny o f Printers, 65.
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his average contribution amounting to about seven dollars. It seems quite clear that the 
Vice President adroitly employed moral and financial support in order to coax Callender 
along a path he might not otherwise have followed -  a path that led ultimately to 
Richmond Jail.10
The precise nature o f Jefferson’s design on Callender remains elusive. Certainly 
he intended the Scotsman’s writing to incite the electorate’s passions against Adams and 
the Federalists, and he could not have been ignorant o f the fact that an implementation o f 
the Sedition Act within the borders o f the Old Dominion would rally countless supporters 
to the Republican cause. However, there is no evidence that Jefferson explicitly set 
Callender up to tempt the Federalists’ wrath. Unlike Supreme Court Justice Samuel 
Chase, who publicized his intention to carry a copy o f  The Prospect Before Us into 
Richmond and use it to “teach the people to distinguish between the liberty and 
licentiousness o f the press,” Jefferson and his cohorts did not preordain a victim for the 
symbolic battle of ideologies that they anticipated and that Callender’s trial ultimately 
became. In fact, they did not begin to regard a local action o f seditious libel as a 
foregone conclusion until well after the publication o f Callender’s offensive work. 
Therefore, it would be specious to assume that Jefferson intended to create a political 
pawn of Callender through dogmatic and fiscal cajolery, although there is no doubt that
10 Jefferson to Monroe, 15 July 1802, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” NEHGR, 52 
(1897): 157-58; Callender to Jefferson, 22 September 1798, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” 
NEHGR, 51 (1896): 328-29; Jefferson to Callender, 11 October 1798, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of 
Congress; Callender to Jefferson, 10 August 1799, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” NEHGR, 
51 (1896): 445-46; Jefferson to Callender, 6 October 1799, in ibid., 449; for Jefferson’s subscriptions to 
Callender, see the list compiled from the Vice President’s notebooks by Paul Leicester Ford in ibid., 324- 
25.
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the Republicans seized the opportunity to do so once Chase’s zealous machinations made 
the journalist’s martyrdom possible.11
One o f the most compelling aspects o f Callender’s trial is that his defense was 
almost entirely state-funded. Immediately upon his arrest, Jefferson wrote to Monroe, “I 
think it essentially just and necessary that Callender be substantially defended.”
Although he vacillated between public intervention and private contribution as the 
preferred means to this end, he ultimately thought it best to lay the issue before the 
legislature. “It is become peculiarly their cause,” he concluded, “and may furnish them a 
fine opportunity o f shewing their respect to the union and at the same time doing justice 
in another way to those whom they cannot protect without committing the publick 
tranquility.”12 At once, Jefferson expressed a sense o f responsibility to the man whom he 
had wheedled into a criminal position and emphasized the political currency that might 
be gained by mounting a symbolic defense. However, the legislature’s involvement 
became unnecessary when three men o f substantial distinction offered Callender their
11 An Annapolis lawyer named John Thomson Mason testified at Chase’s impeachment trial that the justice 
had informed him of his intentions regarding Callender while riding the circuit in Maryland during the 
spring of 1800. When Mason informed Chase that he had not read The Prospect Before Us, he responded 
that a “Mr. Luther had sent a copy to him, and had scored the parts that were libelous, and that he would 
carry it to Richmond with him as a proper subject for prosecution.” He also declared that “before he left 
Richmond, he would teach the people to distinguish between the liberty and licentiousness of the press,” 
and “that if  the commonwealth or its inhabitants were not too depraved to furnish a jury of good and 
respectable men, he would certainly punish Callender.” Chase apparently prearranged the men who would 
serve as jurors as well, for they were all Federalists, despite the party’s minority status in Richmond. When 
one of the jurors asked to be dismissed, as he had already developed a strong opinion regarding the issue at 
hand, Chase refused. Furthermore, he rebuffed the defense’s attempts to ask potential jurors whether they 
had formed any opinions with respect to the book called The Prospect Before Us. These indiscretions, 
combined with Chase’s general rudeness toward Callender’s attorneys, constituted a substantial portion of 
the indictment of impeachment that die justice later faced. See Samuel H. Smith, ed., The Trial o f Samuel 
Chase, 2 vols. (1805; reprint New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 1: 193. Monroe to Madison, 15 May 1800, 
and Madison to Monroe, 23 May 1800, in Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe, 
7 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1898-1903), 388-90.
12 Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings o f Thomas Jefferson, 7: 448. Jefferson’s observation that 
the sedition law was particularly the cause of the Virginia State Legislature was undoubtedly a reference to 
the Virginia Resolutions of 1800, which he and Madison conceived together.
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services free o f charge. Although these men acted o f their own accord, it is impossible to
ignore the official state connections that they each maintained; Philip Norbome Nicholas
was Virginia’s recently appointed Attorney General, William Wirt was Clerk o f the
House of Delegates, and George Hay was Governor Monroe’s son-in-law and the future
Attorney General o f  the United States. In addition, Colonel John Taylor, leader o f the
Virginia Assembly, raised over one hundred dollars on Callender’s behalf, and the
Republican members o f  the House o f Delegates raised twice that sum. Meriwether Jones,
official printer to the Commonwealth, organized eleven fellow sympathizers to sponsor
Callender’s prison fees. Thus, the state o f Virginia undeniably adopted Callender’s cause
as its own. Significantly, the legal approach they embraced in the summer o f 1800
departed markedly from the tactics employed by every other printer indicted under the 
1 ^sedition law.
The majority o f  Americans prosecuted for seditious libel on the eve o f Jefferson’s 
election formulated their cases within the strict construction o f the law. The 1798 
measure allowed any person indicted under it to offer the truth o f his or her words as a 
defense. This proviso created a more flexible interpretation o f seditious libel than 
English common law had previously recognized, but it did not necessarily render the law 
less odious than British precedents, as Levy and the New Libertarians have argued. In 
fact, as James Morton Smith underlines, the “truth as a defense” clause actually shifted 
the traditional burden o f proof onto the accused, thus confirming the Sedition Act’s status 
as one o f the most injudicious measures o f the early national period. Nevertheless, when 
facing a jury, all o f the men indicted prior to Callender dutifully argued the veracity of
13 See Durey, The Hammer o f Truth, 130.
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their printed claims, accepting this tack as their only hope for acquittal.14 When Thomas 
Cooper declared in his April 1800 trial, “I have published nothing which the truth will not 
justify,” he was repeating a by-then familiar yet futile refrain. Among Callender’s 
predecessors, only one, Congressman Matthew Lyon o f Vermont, dared to suggest that 
the act o f Congress under which the jurors were assembled was “unconstitutional and 
void.” However, this bold declaration served merely as a preface to his larger argument 
o f truth, and he failed to offer any elaboration on the issue o f constitutionality.15
In direct contrast to Lyon’s approach, truth as a defense comprised a mere 
preamble to Callender’s forcible attack on the constitutionality o f the Sedition Act. Early 
in the proceedings, it became evident that Chase would impede the journalist’s lawyers 
from demonstrating the truth whenever possible. Most significantly, Chase refused to 
postpone Callender’s trial until the following court term, a move which would have 
allowed Nicholas, Hay, and Wirt sufficient time to gather the witnesses needed to prove 
the veracity o f  all twenty charges contained in the indictment. The precipitateness o f the 
trial was in fact highly irregular. Nicholas later testified at Chase’s impeachment trial, 
and when asked whether he ever knew o f a party coming to trial for a misdemeanor 
during the same term that the presentment was made, Nicholas replied simply, “Never.” 
Furthermore, the court quickly dismissed the testimony o f those limited witnesses who
14 Seven men were indicted for seditious libel before Callender’s trial began in June 1800. Two of 
them, William Cobbett and John Daly Burke, actually became victims of legally dubious common law 
indictments, issued by the federal government in anticipation of the Sedition Act’s 1798 passage.
Therefore, they did not receive the benefit of a trial by jury. Cobbett did not offer a defense, and Burke’s 
case was eventually settled out of court. However, Matthew Lyon, Thomas Cooper, Anthony Haswell, 
William Durrell, and Jedidiah Peck relied on the “truth as a defense” clause if  they formulated a defense at 
all. Durrell did not argue against the charges he faced, and was later pardoned. The proceedings against 
Peck were ultimately dropped, as New York Federalists feared creating a martyr out of this increasingly 
popular Ostego Republican. See Wharton, State Trials, and James Morton Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 421- 
22.
15 Wharton, State Trials.
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did manage to attend Callender’s trial despite inclement weather and short notice. For 
example, when Nicholas called Colonel John Taylor o f Caroline to speak to Callender’s 
charge that President Adams was a professed aristocrat, serviceable to British interests 
(the twelfth count o f the indictment), Chase would not allow his testimony because 
Taylor could only confirm Adams’s vote against the 1798 Sequestration Law, which 
provided for the seizure o f British property in America. “No evidence . . .  is admissible 
that does not go to justify the whole charge,” Chase explained. “You must prove both 
these parts, or you prove nothing.” Again, Chase’s impeachment trial revealed the 
atypicality o f  this prosecution when John Marshall testified that he had never heard such 
an objection made by the court, “except in this particular case.” The justice’s curt 
dismissal o f the defense’s first and only witness caused Nicholas to take his seat, 
effectively abandoning all hope o f proving the accuracy o f Callender’s words.16
At this juncture in the proceedings, Callender’s defense came to an end and his 
lawyers put the Sedition Act itself on trial. In a highly unorthodox (yet not altogether 
unexpected) maneuver, William Wirt rose and entreated the jury to implement the power 
o f judicial review. In the years preceding Marbury v. Madison (1803), some pundits, 
including Callender’s lawyers, believed that the power to assess and, if necessary, nullify 
federal law rested in petit juries. Wirt notified Callender’s jurors that deciding whether 
or not they possessed “the right to determine the law as well as the fact” would comprise 
“a principle part o f [their] inquiry.” He further informed them that to find a defendant 
guilty o f  a crime they considered unconstitutional would be a violation o f the their oaths.
16 Robertson, ed., Trial of Callender; Smith., ed., Trial of Chase, 1: 191; “Testimony in the Trial of 
Samuel Chase,” in Cullen, et al., eds., The Papers o f  John Marshall, 6:354.
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In what proved to be the most levelheaded ruling o f the entire trial, Chase hastily silenced 
Wirt, insisting that federal judges alone possessed the “proper and competent authority” 
to determine the law. Wirt took his seat, exasperated, without fully articulating his 
position.17
Interestingly, the lawyer’s campaign to locate the power of judicial review in petit 
juries substantiates J.R. Pole’s belief that early American juries maintained a significant 
degree o f freedom to create and interpret the law. The dubious “power o f the jury to 
determine the validity or nullity o f the law” was such a crucial part o f the Sedition Act 
debate in Virginia that Chase came into the Commonwealth expecting to face the issue. 
He carried with him a prepared statement, which decisively rejected Wirt’s argument. 
“The power to abrogate or make laws nugatory, is equal to the power o f making them,” 
Chase declared, in an argument that Pole mirrors directly. “The evident consequences of 
this right in juries,” he continued, “will be that a law o f congress will be in operation in 
one state and not in another.” This statement underlines and supports Pole’s observation 
that distinct regional customs gave rise to divergent applications o f the law throughout 
the colonial era. The lack o f legal uniformity that prevailed in early America helps 
explain why Virginia emerged from the British common law system with an 
interpretation o f the freedom o f the press that differed considerably from that professed 
by any o f  her sister states. It also provides a broader understanding o f the Sedition Act as 
one o f countless growing pains experienced by a collection o f polities striving to come 
together as one. Chase’s rejection o f individual juries as interpreters o f the law and the 
Federalists’ larger attempt to promote universal legal standards through federal statutes
17 Robertson, ed., Tried of Callender, 53, 67.
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such as the Sedition Act represent a movement to overcome the tendency toward 
disunion that divergent readings o f the law inspired.
Chase’s rejection o f Wirt’s attempt at jury nullification ensured that Callender 
would not earn a reprieve on the basis o f the Constitution, yet this did not prevent Hay 
from rising to deliver an impassioned defense o f the First Amendment. In Hay’s 
estimation, it was the supposedly liberal ‘"truth as a defense” clause that rendered the 
sedition law illegitimate. This provision, Hay argued, forced Americans to do what had 
never been done before, to “draw a line o f determination between fact and opinion.” 
Opinions are statements o f belief and preference, and are rarely identifiable as either true 
or false. Therefore, if  the government declared its citizens free to express only those 
observations that they could prove to be absolutely true, then the field o f sentiments 
guarded by the First Amendment would grow so narrow as to render the measure 
meaningless. What is so fascinating about Hay’s argument is that it clearly negates the 
prevailing scholarly understanding o f what the Virginia Republicans meant when they 
complained that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. Callender’s lawyers were not 
insisting that seditious libel be prosecuted only at the state level; they were clearly 
arguing to abolish the legal doctrine altogether. These men stood before the bar, 
representing Callender and the citizenry o f Virginia, because they believed in the “cause 
o f the Constitution,” and they defined this cause in terms o f the First Amendment. The 
arguments proffered at Callender’s trial evince that, contrary to Levy’s allegation, state
1 ftsovereignty was not the dominant Virginian concern.
n Trial of Callender, 59-60; Petersburg Intelligencer, 17 June 1800; Levy, Legacy o f Suppression,
219.
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It appears quite evident that Callender mattered to Hay, Wirt, and Nicholas only 
insofar as he afforded them a public stage upon which to attack the viability o f the 
Sedition Act. Nicholas told the Petersburg Intelligencer in June 1800 that “he did not 
consider himself as simply defending this poor unprotected and friendless foreigner. 
Through him he defended the liberty o f  the press.” Hay was far less diplomatic when 
describing his motives for accepting Callender’s case. At Chase’s trial, when asked to 
clarify what he meant when he claimed to defend “the cause and not the man,” Hay 
replied: “It was the cause o f the constitution, and I did not mean to defend Callender 
farther than he was connected with that cause.” Indeed, once Chase had rejected each of 
the lawyers’ attempts to make a constitutional argument at Callender’s trial, Hay, Wirt, 
and Nicholas ceremoniously packed up their papers and quitted the courtroom, leaving 
their client helpless before the bar. This well-choreographed exodus certainly produced 
the desired dramatic effect, but it also exposed the minimal extent to which Callender’s 
lawyers concerned themselves with their client’s fate. The “truth as a defense” tactic 
initially adopted by Nicholas may be explained as a necessary pretense. As the 
mechanism that allowed Virginia Republicans openly to attack a hated law, Callender 
required a pantomime defense. However, time, perspective, and Callender’s 1803 death 
allowed Hay to admit more openly that the Constitution had been his chief, if  not only, 
interest.19
There is a troubling irony inherent in the skewed commitment o f Callender’s 
lawyers. In theory, it should be impossible to separate the cause o f any individual citizen 
from the cause o f civil liberties. What could motivate a spirited defense o f free
19 Petersburg Intelligencer, 17 June 1800; Smith, ed., Tried o f Chase, 1:179.
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expression, such as that delivered by Hay in 1800, if  not the desire to protect men like 
Callender? The lack o f commitment Hay, Wirt, and Nicholas demonstrated toward their 
client during his trial, combined with the Republican Party’s subsequent abandonment o f 
him, suggests that late-eighteenth-century Virginians maintained a very specific view of 
who should be able to engineer public expression under the protection o f their expansive 
definition o f the First Amendment. Callender did not suit most gentleman-politicians’ 
image o f a guardian o f  public opinion. Therefore, while he provided a convenient vehicle 
through which to fight for the rights o f refined journalists who were needed to inform the 
sovereign people, Callender’s own freedom mattered very little to the men who defended 
him. The libertarian definition o f a free press advocated by late-eighteenth-century 
Virginians applied to party publicists but not party propagandists, and Callender fell into 
the latter category. A closer examination o f the aftermath o f the Scotsman’s trial and 
imprisonment will cast this distinction in sharper relief.
The story o f Callender’s life after 1800 is as infamous as it is brief. Following the 
departure o f his lawyers, the court quickly returned a guilty verdict and imposed a 
sentence o f nine months in prison, accompanied by a two hundred dollar fine. From his 
dreary cell in Richmond Jail, Callender defiantly composed a second part to The Prospect 
Before Us, which was published while he was still imprisoned, indicating the Sedition 
Act’s complete lack of deterrent effect. When his term came to an end on March 2, 1801, 
the day before the Sedition Act expired, he emerged from confinement harboring 
justifiable expectations of patronage, now that Jefferson had achieved the presidency. 
When denied such aid, Callender turned his pen against his former mentor. As the first 
journalist to write about Jefferson’s liaison with “Dusky Sally” Hemmings, he ignited a
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scandal that continues to engage Americans today. Thus earning himself a reputation for 
blackmail, Callender became an impoverished and inebriated pen-for-hire, frequently 
writing on behalf o f his former political enemies. In July 1803, when he drowned in the 
shallow waters o f the James River, contemporaries regarded his pathetic demise as the 
deserved comeuppance awaiting one o f the most perfidious scandalmongers o f a 
politically rancorous age. Few historians have endeavored to contradict this perception. 
However, it is unfair to assume that Callender’s apparent loss o f integrity preceded his 
acrimonious break with the Republican Party.20
The chasm that ultimately developed between Jefferson and Callender emerged 
immediately after the journalist’s trial. Incarceration quickly desensitized Callender to 
the volatile political climate, which moderated considerably as the election o f 1800 drew 
near. According to Michael Durey, Callender went to prison imagining Jefferson as the 
radical zealot who had penned the Kentucky Resolutions and revived the “Spirit o f ’76.” 
However, as the Federalist Party began to crumble inwardly, Republicans realized that 
the best strategy for the 1800 campaign would be to lie low and let their opponents 
continue destroying their own credibility. (Jefferson himself was reluctant to abandon his 
radical inclinations. In late 1800, he entertained a plan to present Congress with a 
declaration o f constitutional principles, which was steeped in the rhetoric o f 1776. 
However, Madison successfully persuaded the candidate to moderate his approach.) This 
party-wide shift toward the center rendered vitriolic publicists such as Callender 
unnecessary; yet Callender himself remained committed to the radical principles that had 
guided him since his youth in Scotland. Even if  he had apprehended the party’s restraint
20 Durey, Hammer o f Truth, especially chap. 6-7.
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from within his isolated cell, it is highly unlikely that he would have ceased to produce 
extremist tracts. In this sense, it was Callender’s political constancy, rather than a 
mercenary’s mentality, that precipitated his defection from the party o f Jefferson. His 
politics were determined by principle, not by faction, and when he emerged from prison 
in 1801, the Republicans’ moderate new policy disenchanted him so severely that he 
turned his back on the Jeffersonians forever.21
Even more painful to Callender than his chosen party’s shifting values was the 
personal abandonment he felt when Jefferson abruptly ended their correspondence. 
Callender wrote to Jefferson regularly from Richmond Jail, providing him with pages 
from the second volume o f The Prospect Before Us, apprising him o f conditions in the 
jail, and assuring him o f his own well-being. Initially, Jefferson’s failure to respond did 
not trouble Callender, who understood his mentor’s extreme distrust o f the post, and 
assumed that caution had inspired Jefferson’s silence. By the fall, however, he confessed 
some growing anxiety about the situation. “Whether you indeed received my letters, I do 
not know,” he wrote to Jefferson. “I should be much obliged to you for sending me a few 
lines . . . merely to let me know that the packets have, or have not, reached you.” But 
Callender never received any such assurance. Although he continued sending drafts o f 
his prolific essays to Jefferson, his sponsor’s prolonged stillness must have provoked 
Callender’s suspicion. The tenor o f the correspondence, which was by this point 
unilateral, changed markedly after October. Callender’s letters became shorter and lost 
the political musings and personal details that had filled his earlier missives. He grew 
“afraid of being troublesome” and apologetically referred to his letters as intrusions, as
21 Durey, Hammer o f Truth, 139-40.
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though he believed that he had somehow earned Jefferson’s ire. Nevertheless, he 
continued writing to Jefferson, seeming to assume that their political relationship would 
resume upon his release from prison.
Callender was disabused o f this illusion early in 1801, when Jefferson ignored the 
journalist’s request for patronage. Speculations about the sort o f press that he could 
operate and which newspaper he might edit constituted a regular feature o f Callender’s 
prison letters. Then, on January 23 he informed Madison o f “a berth which I want to 
apply for to the new President. The income is no great affair., .but it would give me the 
decisive command o f  several newspapers, besides other accommodations in the printing 
line.” Many historians have deemed Callender’s request for official support 
inappropriate and rightfully denied. However, the Scotsman had every reason to believe 
that he was entitled to some form o f remuneration for his services to the Republican 
cause. Others, including Philip Freneau and Meriwether Jones, had received official 
posts that allowed them to work as party publicists; why should Callender, who had 
suffered in prison for his efforts, be any different? Furthermore, Jefferson had not given 
Callender any reasonable indication that the financial support he had enjoyed while 
writing the first section o f The Prospect Before Us would cease before the publication of 
the second. Prior to his trial, Callender had been an important operative in the 
Republican press network; he knew how the system worked, and he thought he 
understood what kind of support he could expect from the politicians he served. His 
failure to secure the provision he had anticipated confirmed the fear of betrayal that
22 Callender to Jefferson, 11 October 1800, in W. C. Ford, ed., NEHGR, 52 (1897): 19-20; 
Callender to Jefferson, October 1800, in ibid., 20.
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Jefferson’s disregard had inspired, and his behavior subsequently became suspicious and 
irrational.23
The circumstance that finally destroyed Callender’s faith in his former allies was 
their failure to remit his two hundred dollar fine. Upon Jefferson’s ascent to the 
executive office, he proclaimed that he would “not lose one moment” delivering 
recompense to the aggrieved journalist. However, David M. Randolph, a treasury official 
from the preceding administration, had contrived to put the funds beyond Jefferson’s 
reach, and the new president could not fulfill his promise without “laying the whole 
subject before Congress,” which Monroe feared would inspire “specious criticisms” 
among Jefferson’s enemies. Political expediency prevailed, and weeks passed without 
any progress on the subject o f the fine. Callender, already feeling defensive, refused to 
accept bureaucratic intransigence as an excuse. He believed that the difficulties with the 
fine were either intended or “the offspring o f . . .  indifference.” Given the many 
disappointments Callender had suffered at the hands o f men he considered to be allies, it 
is unsurprising that he adopted such a cynical view. This final frustration pushed 
Callender beyond the grip o f reason, and he soon adopted a course o f action that would 
become the primary source o f his centuries-long disgrace.24
In April 1801 Callender began to threaten Jefferson openly. “President as he is,” 
he wrote to Madison on April 27, 1801, “he may trust me if he pleases, that I am not the 
man, who is either to be oppressed or plundered with impunity.” Callender knew that
23 Callender to Madison, 23 January 1801, in ibid., 22-23.
24 Callender to Madison, 27 April 1801, in ibid., 153-54; Jefferson to Monroe, 26 May 1801, in P. 
L. Ford, ed., Writings o f Thomas Jefferson, 8: 57-8; Madison to Monroe, 1 June 1801, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., 
The Writings o f James Madison, 9 vols. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900-1910), 6: 420-22.
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Jefferson had paid him to vilify Adams in print, even if  the new president would not 
admit as much even to himself. Furthermore, he recognized the political currency that 
Jefferson’s enemies potentially could and eventually did make o f this information. “I can 
keep, what I design to keep, as well as anybody,” he advised Madison. “And surely, sir, 
many syllogisms cannot be necessary to convince Mr. Jefferson that, putting feelings and 
principles out of the question, it is not proper for him to quarrel with me.” In one sense, 
incredulity inspired Callender to resort to this devious tactic; he could not believe that 
Jefferson would truly desert him when he had sacrificed so much to “serve the cause.”
He was probably also responding to an impulse o f panic; friendless and out o f work, he 
employed the only leverage he still possessed in an attempt to compensate for the loss o f 
party support he had expected to receive upon his release from prison. Callender 
clumsily interjected brusque requests for the recently vacated Postmaster o f Richmond 
appointment between each o f the threats cited above. It is perfectly reasonable to 
construe this behavior as blackmail, but it is also important to acknowledge that 
Callender’s actions were not unprovoked.25
At one level, the explanation for Callender’s expulsion from the inner sanctum o f 
the Republican journalism network is very simple. The obliteration o f the Federalist 
Party, which would never reclaim its former power after the election o f 1800, created the 
need for a completely new form o f political comportment. Reconciliation became the
25 Callender to Madison, 27 April 1801, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” NEHGR,
52 (1897): 153-55. The political importance of a late-eighteenth-century city postmaster, which is today a 
relatively neutral position, is revealed in Joanne B. Freeman’s Affairs o f Honor: National Politics in the 
New Republic (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001). In this account, Freeman suggests that 
because American political culture was propagated by the print media, “the mails were a central vehicle of 
national governance.” Therefore, Callender was requesting an appointment of much greater consequence 
than modem sensibilities might comprehend. See Freeman, Affiars o f Honor, 143.
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buzzword o f the first Jefferson administration. Callender, whose unbridled radicalism 
prevented him from countenancing the Republican Party’s post-electoral moderation, 
became an outmoded weapon. In fact, continued friendship with the man who had struck 
such powerful blows against the Federalists could only serve to embarrass Jeffersonians 
in the new atmosphere o f political cordiality. Callender understood this dilemma only 
too well. “I have gone to such desperate lengths to serve the party,” he wrote to Madison, 
“that I believe your friend [Jefferson] designs to discountenance and sacrifice me, as a 
kind of scapegoat to political decorum as a kind o f compromise to federal feelings.” 
Callender’s words during this phase o f his life are frequently dismissed as the baseless 
musings o f a slighted man, but there is some evidence to substantiate his explanation for 
his own fall from Jefferson’s favor.26
A series o f letters that passed between Callender, St. George Tucker, and John 
Marshall in the fall o f 1800 demonstrates the political volatility o f the journalist’s 
situation. In early November, just as Jefferson’s unexpected silence truly began to 
concern Callender, the prisoner applied to St. George Tucker for intercession. He had 
somehow fallen under the mistaken impression that Tucker could release him from prison 
by issuing a writ o f Habeas Corpus. He would have requested this favor sooner, he 
informed Tucker, but he “was told that the measure, if successful, would afford an 
opportunity for misrepresenting the political sentiments o f the State and that by such 
means, it might produce a dangerous impression upon the republican interest at the next 
election for president.” Callender did not indicate precisely who had advised him thus,
26 Callender to Madison, 27 April 1801, in W. C. Ford, ed., “Jefferson and Callender,” NEHGR, 
52 (1897): 153-55.
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but whoever it was clearly maintained a greater concern for political appearances than for 
Callender’s welfare. For his own part, Callender seemed inclined to agree. His refusal to 
press his cause precipitously demonstrates the level o f his commitment to the Republican 
faction, as well as the gradual nature o f his fall from grace. Tucker’s response to 
Callender’s inquiry was brief but sincere. He informed the prisoner that he could not 
grant the writ and warned that an application to the proper authorities promised “little 
satisfaction or success.” He offered Callender sympathy but no hope.
Without Callender’s knowledge, Tucker immediately forwarded the matter to 
John Marshall, an old acquaintance. Referring to incendiary anti-Adams tracts recently 
published by Alexander Hamilton and John Fenno, Tucker proffered a delicate 
observation:
Should it happen that Callender should expiate his offence by a severe 
imprisonment and no notice be taken of more conspicuous and influential 
persons under similar or more provoking circumstances it might produce a 
reflection too painful for repetition to you. I am far from being anxious that Mr. 
Adams should do a popular act, but I should be gratified that he would do a 
humane one.
Tucker’s letter implies that the voting public will recognize the hypocrisy o f Adams’s 
policy regarding enforcement o f the Sedition Act, producing a “painful reflection” (i.e. 
public disgrace and a diminished electoral return). It also intimates that Tucker may have 
considered withholding this request on account o f the fact that a favorable outcome might 
enhance Adams’s electoral appeal. Marshall responded that Adams did not intend to act
27 Callender to Tucker, 4 November 1800, and Tucker to Callender, 6 November 1800,in Tucker- 
Coleman Papers.
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on the issue “’til the choice o f the future President shall be over.” Clearly, Callender’s 
case remained a political hornets’ nest, and no one wanted to stir it -  not even Callender 
himself — until after the fateful election o f 1800. On the surface, the fact that political 
considerations ranked above Callender’s rights and liberty would seem to confirm the 
accusation that real politique, rather than ideological commitment, motivated Republican 
resistance to the Sedition Act. However, another explanation for these gentlemen’s 
limited dedication to their propagandist exists.
On a deeper level, Republican politicians expelled Callender from their intricate
and effective journalism network because they never truly believed that he belonged there
in the first place. Over the course o f their communication on the subject Tucker and
Marshall referred repeatedly to Callender’s social inferiority, and the effect that his
diminished status should have had on his trial. Marshall agreed with Tucker’s assessment
that Hamilton’s libel was “more virulent, more bitter, [and] more injurious” than The
Prospect Before Us because the Secretary o f the Treasury was “worthy o f attention and
his shaft may stick.” Just as a seditious libel gained force with the increasing station of
its object, it flagged with the diminishing status o f its author. Indeed, Marshall
considered Chase’s prosecution o f Callender misguided because the Scotsman’s
circumstances placed him “below [the law’s] resentment.” These sentiments echoed the
arguments submitted by Callender’s lawyers when asserting that a continuance o f the trial
posed no threat to Adams:
The reputation of the President of the United States must forever rest on the 
opinion of a virtuous and intelligent people, and standing on its mighty basis,
28 St. George Tucker to John Marshall, 6 November 1800, in Cullen et al., eds., The Papers o f 
John Marshall, 6: 4-5; Marshall to Tucker, 18 November 1800, in ibid., 14-15.
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could never be effected by the abuse or declamation of an individual, and that 
individual, an obscure and friendless foreigner.
Callender was not virtuous, intelligent, or American enough to affect the nation’s stolid 
public opinion. He was, however, vitriolic enough to engage the ephemeral popular 
opinion, which is probably why he appealed to Jefferson.29
Joanne B. Freeman’s recent monograph, Affairs o f  Honor: National Politics in the 
Early Republic (2001) helps explain Callender’s strictly defined utility. In her account o f 
the paper wars that engaged politicians throughout the 1790s, Freeman explains that a 
hierarchy o f print existed. Gentleman-politicians exchanged public-minded letters, which 
were framed as personal correspondences but distributed for wider consumption, and 
political pamphlets, which provided the ideal platform for detailed arguments that 
appealed to reason. Because reputation and honor were so important to a gentleman’s 
political status, few elite individuals dared to dabble in more popular public forums, such 
as broadsides and newspapers. Paradoxically, the newspaper’s growing status as the 
most influential o f all print media made it impossible for hopeful candidates to ignore the 
partisan rags that “connect[ed] the extended republic through chains o f information,” 
precisely as Madison had intended. As Freeman explains, “a newspaper’s wide reach 
was both its power and its threat. Particularly for a politician, whose reputation was his 
livelihood, newspaper exposure could do as much damage as good.” Therefore, most
29 Ibid.; Hay’s arguments before the bar were reprinted in the Petersburg Intelligencer, 17 June
1800.
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gentleman-politicians avoided the threat o f dishonor before a wide audience by securing 
editorial champions to write on their behalf.30
Jeffrey L. Pasley advances a similar argument in The Tyranny o f  Printers, which 
relates how the political rancor o f the 1790s obliged printers to abandon their 
traditionally neutral approach to journalism. For the first time, printers began to function 
as professional political agents. Like Freeman, Pasley points to the code of political 
conduct that prevailed as parties emerged in late-eighteenth-century America as the 
inspiration for the increased agency o f newspaper editors. According to classical 
republican principles, virtuous leaders acted on behalf o f their entire constituency, rather 
than the interests o f a specific faction, and they never openly solicited electoral support. 
Thus, Pasley explains, printers “became indispensable public spokesmen for the new 
parties and surrogate campaigners for gentlemen candidates who needed to avoid 
displays o f partisanship.” As government officials continued to rely on the press for 
publicity and reward loyal printers with appointments to office, the news media and the 
parties merged so completely that newspaper editors often ran for political office. The 
birth o f newspaper-based politics elevated journalists to a higher level o f public service 
and political influence. Nevertheless, as Pasley maintains, this transition occurred “more 
or less against their will.”31
The reasons why many journalists were slow to adapt to the politicization o f the 
editorial profession are complex, and a consideration o f the partisan journalists who 
sustained the political conflicts o f eighteenth-century Europe will help illuminate this
30 Freeman, Affairs o f Honor, 123, 125.
31 Pasley, Tyranny o f Printers, 22-23, 64.
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underexamined issue. The mythology surrounding London’s Grub Street, which first 
emerged during the mid seventeenth century, would have certainly been familiar to late- 
eighteenth-century Americans. Grub Street once referred to an actual place in London, 
where impoverished and vice-ridden writers struggled to make a living by the pen. The 
English Civil War popularized the district by producing a proliferation o f political 
pamphleteers who successfully supported themselves through writing. Grub Street 
reached its heyday during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when 
gentleman-politicians discovered the utility o f employing the hack writers o f London’s 
lower sectors in the political wars that divided the nation’s elite class. An unholy alliance 
grew between these men o f different worlds wherein gentlemen stooped to associate with 
contemptible, drinking, carousing, urchins, who tainted the process o f public discourse by 
selling their talents to the highest bidder, regardless o f political principle. Eventually, 
Grub Street attained the status o f a metaphor, representing what historian Philip Pinkus 
calls “an eternal spirit that dwells in the heart o f every author whose belly is at odds with 
his principles, inspiring a happiness greater far by the simple merchandising process of 
giving the customer what he wants.”32
It remains unknown precisely how early Americans perceived Grub Street culture, 
as no scholar has yet undertaken a determined study o f this topic. Nevertheless, the 
interpretive framework advanced by Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood once again make 
speculation possible. As these scholars have suggested, the American Revolution 
represented a purging process through which patriots sought to separate themselves from
32 Philip Pinkus, Grub Street Stripped Bare: The Scandalous Lives and Pornographic Works o f the 
Original Grub Street Writers (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 13.
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the political corruption that permeated the British government. The practice o f hiring 
hack writers to levy criticism against political opponents surely ranked among the sources 
o f corruption that Americans deplored. Hence, Federalists and Republicans alike 
associated hack writers with the disgraceful heritage o f the British partisan press, and 
attempted to maintain their distance from such individuals as long as possible.33 Indeed, 
the leading scholarship on French Grub Street culture tends to verify this reading of early 
Americans’ disdain for hired political writers.
In his influential 1982 monograph, The Literary Underground o f  the Old Regime, 
Robert Damton argues that the self-loathing harbored by many unwitting Parisian Grub 
Street authors translated into one o f the most important intellectual origins o f the French 
Revolution. As in the American republic, French society recognized a hierarchy within 
the writing profession, with a collection o f grand gens de lettres controlling the diffusion 
o f knowledge from the top-down. Nevertheless, Damton reports, the population o f Grub 
Street burgeoned during the last years o f the Old Regime, when the provincial disciples 
o f Voltaire flocked to Paris in search o f glory and wealth. Instead, they found 
disillusionment. Their humble circumstances prevented them from succeeding in Paris, 
where “all o f  the old devices, such as privilege and protection” -  which were awarded to 
men o f “sound opinion” and respectable birth — remained as necessary as ability. “Seen 
from the perspective o f Grub Street,” Damton explains, “the republic o f letters was a lie.” 
Unable to support themselves properly in a saturated market that was blind to talent, 
these young provincials became political spies, smut-peddlers, and authors o f libelles. In
33 Bailyn, Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution; Wood, Creation o f the American 
Republic.
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effect, the Old Regime “violated their moral core and desecrated their youthful visions o f 
serving humanity honorably in Voltaire’s church.” They abhorred what they had 
become, as well as the regime that had pushed them to it, with a visceral passion that 
ultimately gave the Jacobin revolution its “authentic voice.” Thus, a deep disdain for 
hack writers and all they represented contributed to the driving impulses o f the French 
Revolution. In America, as in France, political hacks who wrote for money represented a 
shameful form o f past corruption, and to rely on them as free Americans would be to 
betray the spirit o f the Revolution.34
American gentlemen consequently entered the field o f partisan journalism with a 
great deal o f hesitancy. They feared potential corruption and the derogatory social stigma 
attached to hired political writers. Therefore, when John Fenno took it upon himself to 
create an official government organ, The Gazette o f  the United States, he insisted upon 
separating his editorial duties from the actual labor o f printing. He believed that this 
approach would salvage his prestige; as a man o f letters, toiling for the good o f the 
nation, he would be spared the low reputation accorded to most o f the period’s scurrilous 
printers. Fenno’s vision may have been impractical and idealistic, but it represented 
perfectly the prevailing conception o f public opinion as the province of the literati. In 
keeping with French philosophy, early national leaders preferred men o f sound character 
and reputation to act as their public representatives, and the editors who pioneered 
newspaper-based politics wished to separate themselves as much as possible from the 
conventional image of the party hack, who, in the 1790s, was the object of universal
34 Robert Damton, The Literary Underground of the Old Regime, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 22,23, 36,40. Thanks to my advisor, Robert A. Gross, for suggesting this 
argument.
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contempt. Unfortunately, the greater the distance that these editors placed between 
themselves and the routine business o f journalism, the less adept they proved at 
successfully managing a newspaper. Consequently, as the election o f 1800 drew near 
and partisan hostilities reached a fevered pitch, party leaders began to seek a more 
expedient solution to their need for publicity.35
Contrary to the accepted philosophy o f the time, the dissident printers who poured 
into the United States from Britain at the end of the eighteenth century proved the most 
able and willing to act as public spokesmen for the nascent American parties. These men 
possessed a remarkable talent for the propagation o f republican ideology that even the 
most refined gentleman-politician could not ignore. As Durey reports, nearly one-half o f 
the refugees who entered the United States in the 1790s were involved in journalism and 
pamphleteering. These men had been raising voices o f dissent against constituted 
authorities in the British Isles for decades, and they came to United States with 
convictions for which they had already suffered. They ranged from hack writers and 
newspaper owners to successful media barons. Overall, emigre editors represented 
“perhaps 15 to 20 percent o f all republican printers in this period,” and their influence 
spanned the entire eastern seaboard, “from Georgia to Massachusetts.” They may not 
have suited the accepted ideal o f the gentleman-printer, but they were masters o f their 
trade, and they could certainly rouse public passions, which was precisely what the 
Jeffersonians needed in 1798. Thus, the short-term employment o f radical emigre 
propagandists presented a practical solution to the paucity o f gentlemen willing to 
become active party publicists. Ironically, it was their impressive fortitude in the face o f
35 Pasley, Tyranny o f Printers, 53.
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the Sedition Act that made their displacement possible after 1800, when it should have 
garnered the respect o f the politicians they helped elevate to power.36
According to Pasley’s argument, the failure o f the Sedition Act, more than any 
other event, facilitated the transition o f American journalists from “simple pliers o f the 
printer’s trade” to influential political actors. As Pasley contends, “Federalist oppression 
convinced many printers that there was no place for an honest printer who followed the 
traditional nonpartisan approach.” Consequently, “many of them became political 
professionals, people for whom writing was a way to make a living out of politics, rather 
than the other way around.” The irony o f this situation is that while refugee printers bore 
the brunt o f the “Federalist oppression” that convinced American writers o f the need for a 
partisan press (something that the emigres had long understood), they received few 
opportunities to enter the growing field o f professional political writers. A closer 
examination o f the experience and politics o f the men and women indicted under the 
1798 sedition statute will speak to this truth.37
In Freedom’s Fetters, the seminal work on the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, 
James Morton Smith identifies seventeen verifiable indictments for seditious libel 
between 1798 and 1800. O f these, five were foreign-born radicals working on behalf of 
the Democratic-Republican Party. This figure is somewhat out o f proportion with the 
overall percentage o f republican printers that hailed from the British Isles, a fact that 
emphasizes the unique contribution o f emigres during the struggle to maintain the 
freedom of the press. Furthermore, prolific bibliographies distinguished these writers
36 Durey, “Thomas Paine’s Apostles,” 682.
37 Pasley, 131.
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from most o f the twelve remaining victims o f the Sedition Act; few of the Americans 
indicted under the law boasted any experience speaking or writing for the Republican 
cause. Therefore, while every person affected by the Sedition Act certainly endured 
financial and psychological hardships, it was predominantly the emigre printers whose
n o
professional lives suffered damage.
The foreign-born printers indicted under the Sedition Act form a representative 
group o f late-eighteenth-century British radicals. Thomas Cooper hailed from England, 
John Daly Burk was Irish, Callender emigrated from Scotland, and William Duane was a 
person o f dubious nationality. (Bom in colonial New York, Duane returned to Ireland 
with his family before independence, spent his young adulthood in Calcutta, and then 
returned to the United States in 1796. Throughout his life he claimed American 
citizenship, but the law regarded him as a resident alien.) The fifth foreign-born 
Republican, at whom many claim the Alien and Sedition Acts were specifically aimed, 
was Matthew Lyon o f Vermont. A native o f Ireland, Lyon enjoyed a distinguished career 
in the United States Congress and is therefore not particularly relevant in this study o f 
emigre journalists. However his numerous addresses to constituents, circular letters, and 
speeches delivered in Congress demonstrated his commitment as a politician to the 
dissemination o f Republican ideology. Despite their disparate backgrounds, each o f the
38 James Merton Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 185. Of the twelve American-born citizens indicted 
under the sedition law, only half of them ever published works critical of the ruling party. Indeed, most of 
the Americans brought to trial provide comic examples of the Federalists’ overzealous urge to silence all 
opposition. Three Newark tavem-dwellers were charged for joking about the president’s rear end and 
another two men were charged for erecting a “Jacobin” liberty pole. The sixth and final American-born 
non-printer indicted under the sedition law actually spent the majority of the 1790s as a Federalist, and did 
not defect until 1799, in protest to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Of the six American printers who fell 
victim to the Sedition Law, two died awaiting trial, and three retreated from the field of newspaper 
journalism, failing to transition into the political professionals Pasley describes. Only one, Anthony 
Haswell, overcame Federalist oppression to become a political agent. For biographical information on all 
seventeen individuals see Smith, Freedom’s Fetters and Durey, Transatlantic Radicals.
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four British journalists indicted under the Sedition Act shared key biographical traits. 
Having been driven from their homes once already owing to their commitment to the 
principles o f republicanism, these men had proven their dedication and resilience long 
before the political wars o f the 1790s commenced. Consequently, their militant 
radicalism withstood the Federalist oppression o f 1798-1800.
Thomas Cooper was one o f the most fascinating men o f any nationality residing 
in the United States during the early national period. Although he studied law at Oxford 
and joined the bar upon his father’s insistence, Cooper’s true passion was for the natural 
sciences. He attended medical lectures as a hobby while living in London. In addition to 
practicing law, Cooper traveled to France as an ambassador from a democratic club in 
England to a sister organization across the Channel, a venture that earned him the 
animadversion o f Edmund Burke and the House o f Commons. Cooper’s scathing reply 
to Burke’s censure resulted in a threat o f prosecution. He consequently retreated to 
Manchester, from whence he orchestrated an anti-slavery campaign and continued his 
involvement in the radical Society for Constitutional Information, a group dedicated to 
the dissemination o f radical ideas. During his years in Manchester, Cooper developed a 
mastery o f chemistry and operated a successful textile mill. By the time he decided that 
he could no longer live in a country that did not protect the freedom o f the press, Cooper 
had established himself as a man o f considerable talents, wealth, and property. Upon 
arriving in America, he began an unofficial practice as a country doctor in order to 
supplement his income as a printer. His versatility and value gave him a social standing
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that was unique among the emigre journalists, and would give him a considerable
•  TQadvantage when the race for patronage began m 1800.
Cooper’s American bibliography is as diverse as it is prolific. He wrote treatises 
on political economy, medical jurisprudence, comparative bankruptcy law, the science of 
volcanoes, Calvinism, the freedom o f the press, and the dying o f textiles. He edited a 
popular edition of the Institutes o f  Justinian, compiled several chemistry texts, and 
assembled a general household encyclopedia. His commitment to the cause o f 
international republicanism continued with his editions o f Dr. Joseph Priestley’s and 
Algernon Sidney Johnston’s memoirs. By the time he took control o f the 
Northumberland Gazette for ten weeks in 1799, he was an accomplished writer and 
publisher. Even after surrendering his role as the editor o f this publication, Cooper 
continued to write political essays on behalf o f the Jeffersonians and became so active in 
the months leading up to the 1800 election that the Federalists labeled him one o f the top 
three “Republican scribblers” they wished to silence.40
Unlike Cooper, Burk, Callender, and Duane considered publishing to be their sole 
profession. They were hack writers in the truest sense and possessed the dubious 
reputations to match. However, their inferior social standing did not diminish their 
commitment to the cause of Jeffersonian republicanism. Indeed, as Durey has argued, 
their radicalism remained so militant after the Revolution of 1800 that they alienated 
themselves from their former party cohorts. As the newly elected Jeffersonians 
proceeded to conciliate moderate Federalists by separating themselves from the more
39 Durey, Transatlantic Radicals, 23-5; James Mortem Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 307-33; 
Wharton, State Trials, 659-80.
40 Ibid.
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radical elements o f their party, Burke, Callender, and Duane fell victim to their own 
belligerence and notoriety, which had once sustained the vanguard o f republicanism. 
“Essentially,” Durey claims, “they were all disowned by the republican government.”41 
Although this may be something o f an overstatement, it is true that o f these emigre 
journalists, all o f whom made significant sacrifices for the republican cause, none 
developed into professional political editors. Indeed, I would go one step further than 
Durey and suggest that the degree to which the Republicans disavowed these men was 
directly proportional to their social standing. Callender was the first to feel the sting of 
the Republicans’ rejection. However, the fact that he was not the only one to suffer such 
dismissal suggests that something greater than his desperate and threatening behavior 
motivated the party to turn its back on him.
Burk and Duane proved slightly more successful than Callender when it came to 
adapting to republicanism after 1800, although neither o f them received the patronage 
that they each felt they deserved. In June 1801, Burk composed a detailed letter to 
Jefferson, outlining his service to the Democratic-Republicans in America and requesting 
a government position with a small stipend. Although Burk’s request was politely 
declined, he did not go the way o f Callender. Burk had achieved some success as a 
playwright since emigrating and therefore was regarded as a man with some social skills 
and a gentlemanly manner. This prevented the newly empowered party from rejecting 
him completely. Burk was occasionally invited to give public orations celebrating the 
victory o f Jeffersonianism, and his History o f  the State o f  Virginia was widely acclaimed.
41 Durey, Transatlantic Radicals, 261.
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However, his days as a political editor ended long before that profession came to possess 
a significant degree o f actual power.42
Duane also met with disappointment when he applied to Jefferson for assistance 
in his endeavor to create a national newspaper in Washington City. The new president 
had already persuaded a young editor named Samuel Harrison Smith to establish an 
official party voice in the capitol. Jefferson had met Smith in Philadelphia, where the 
latter man’s father served as Master o f the Freemasons, while both men served as officers 
in the American Philosophical Society. According to Durey, Smith appealed to Jefferson 
specifically because he was ‘‘young, moderate, flexible in his republicanism, and 
untainted by the press campaigns o f the years o f opposition.”43 Essentially, the battle- 
proven Duane was passed over for someone potentially less capable and assuredly less 
controversial. Hence, Duane offers the perfect example o f a man who was denied entry 
to the political editorial profession because he was not, like Smith, “a native..., a 
gentleman, and a scholar.”44 Replicating his recruitment o f Freneau some years earlier, 
Jefferson gravitated toward a man who was in every way different from the competent 
journalists who had served him so well during his party’s most desperate days.
It is impossible to ignore the fact that native-born victims of the Sedition Act did 
not receive such harsh treatment from the Jefferson administration. As Noble E. 
Cunningham reveals in his 1963 study Jeffersonian Republicans in Power, printers who 
had supported the party cause throughout the 1790s expected to receive help after 1800,
42 Durey, Transatlantic Radicals'.; James Morton Smith, Freedom’s Fetters, 204-20.
43 Durey, Transatlantic Radicals, 265
44 Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801- 
1809. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1963), 258-61.
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usually in the form o f government printing contracts. Cunningham identifies a party
policy o f rewarding loyal printers, particularly those who suffered under the Sedition Act,
but he does not recognize that this was not a universal policy. While men like Callender,
Burke, and Duane were left to fend for themselves, Jefferson went out o f his way to
accommodate their native-born counterparts. Abijah Adams, an editor o f the Boston
Independent Chronicle who had spent a mere thirty days in jail for violation o f the
Sedition Act, wrote to Massachusetts Republican Congressman Joseph B. Vamum
requesting a federal printing contract before the House had even decided the presidential
election. Vamum passed the request on to Jefferson, who granted it immediately. Even
more revealing is the case o f Anthony Haswell, the native-born publisher o f the Vermont
Gazette who spent two months in prison after attacking Federalist congressional
candidates in print. When Haswell wrote to Jefferson regarding his inability to retain the
business o f federal officers in local posts, the president replied, “this evil will be
remedied.” Alluding directly to Haswell’s sacrifices to the cause, Jefferson continued:
Your press having been in the habit of inculcating the genuine principles of our 
constitution, and your sufferings for those principles, entitle you to any favors in 
your line which the public servants can give you; and those who do not give them 
act against their duty. Should you continue in the business you will have the 
publication of the laws in your state, and probably whatever else of business any 
of the offices within your state can give.”45
What accounts for the ease with which Adams and Haswell received recognition for their 
efforts, while Callender, Duane, and Burke fell out o f favor? If  Jefferson himself 
believed that two months in prison entitled Haswell to “any favors” the government
45 Jefferson to Haswell, 11 September 1801, cited in Cunningham, 248, emphasis added.
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might be able to offer, then why did Callender’s nine months not gamer him similar 
rewards? Under these circumstances, the argument that Republicans maintained a 
classist and nativist bias when deciding who should speak on their behalf appears 
plausible, if not thoroughly tested.
Ultimately, it was Cooper alone among the emigre victims o f the Sedition Act 
who received the benefit o f political patronage. This is hardly surprising, given his 
superior social status as an accomplished man o f letters who had employed himself as a 
lawyer and a doctor, as well as a printer. Instead of being alienated by the Republican 
Party after the Revolution o f 1800, Cooper developed an intense intellectual 
correspondence with the new president. He felt close enough to Jefferson to remind him 
upon his election “how easy it is to govern too much, and how prone the best rulers are, 
from the best principles, to overact their part.”46 Despite his continuing intimacy with the 
ascendant party, Cooper, like his fellow emigres, did not become a professional political 
editor, even though he alone acquired access to the field. Paradoxically, the very social 
status that made his foreignness irrelevant in the eyes o f those in power rendered the idea 
o f working as a professional political editor repugnant to him. Why would Cooper 
continue as a printer when the Governor o f Pennsylvania offered him the president 
judgeship o f a judicial district? Thus, without exception, the radical emigre journalists 
who powered the Jeffersonian media machine failed to develop into the political 
professionals Pasley has described.
46 Thomas Cooper to Thomas Jefferson, 25 October 1802, quoted in Durey, Transatlantic 
Radicals, 261.
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Ultimately, a very select cadre o f printers enjoyed the benefits o f the forward 
thinking interpretation o f the freedom o f the press that distinguished Virginians from 
other citizens o f the early republic. Several factors conspired to exclude deserving and 
experienced journalists from the full blessings o f liberty. Primarily, the influence o f 
French philosophy over the minds and theories o f political leaders such as James 
Madison resulted in a predetermined prejudice against any political scribbler who did not 
meet certain status requirements. The crucial importance o f public opinion in a 
government where the people are sovereign made it very unlikely that anyone would 
seriously challenge the prevailing conception of the refined gentleman as the guardian o f 
public opinion. Furthermore, the precepts o f political propriety during the late eighteenth 
century hindered radical emigres; editors represented the public face o f genteel statesmen 
who could not campaign on their own behalf, and the newsmen’s social standing and 
comportment reflected directly on the reputations o f the parties and candidates they 
represented. Therefore, it was only natural for party leaders to recruit educated, native- 
born men o f class to direct their media campaigns. The result was a sort o f practical 
dissonance between the dogmatic ideal and the achieved reality o f the law, a phenomenon 
all too familiar in American history.
CONCLUSION
Virginia Republicans maintained a consistently libertarian interpretation o f the 
freedom o f the press throughout the post-Revolutionary period. Their spirited opposition 
to the Sedition Act o f 1798 cannot be explained by their political affiliation alone.
Rather, they drew on their knowledge that free debate about public affairs was an 
everyday fact o f colonial life, as well their steadfast adherence to the radical Whig 
tradition, which provided intellectual continuity between the English Civil War, the 
American Revolution, and the Revolution of 1800. As libertarian interpreters o f press 
freedom, Virginians sought to protect the print media through which sovereign 
Americans stayed informed about public affairs and exercised vigilance over their elected 
officials. However, they did not recognize every voice as equally legitimate within the 
realm of public opinion; eighteenth-century understandings o f the public sphere restricted 
participation in civic affairs to men of class and letters, inhibiting the free expression o f 
artisan printers and lowly hack writers.
From a certain point o f view, Leonard Levy is correct to suggest that the 
extenuating circumstances drove Republicans to adopt a more democratic stance on press 
liberty in 1798. Their desperate effort to promulgate a libertarian interpretation o f the 
freedom o f the press obliged them to rely on radical hack writers. These emigre 
journalists boasted long experience as opposition writers in Britain and possessed the 
advantage o f non-gentlemanly status, which allowed them to dabble in the plebian yet 
effective newspaper medium. In this sense, an impulsive act o f political expediency did 
indeed bring Americans closer than they ever had been to the modem definition o f press
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liberty. Sadly, this full realization o f the First Amendment’s democratic potential was 
short-lived. Virginia Republicans deemed radical emigre printers useful for political 
purposes, but unworthy of social equality and long-term partnership. Once the election 
o f 1800 secured the triumph o f Jeffersonianism, Republicans continued to advocate 
unfettered freedom o f the press for the elite publicists who promulgated public opinion, 
but denied essential patronage to the propagandists who dealt in popular sentiment, 
thereby preventing their former allies from enjoying the unqualified liberty that they had 
helped defend. In this sense, then, even the Virginians who argued so boldly for a 
libertarian definition o f the freedom o f the press compromised their principles during 
times of national crisis, and fell short o f the modem American ideal.
Jefferson and his cohorts would not be the last American leaders to retrench open 
press ideologies when faced with extenuating circumstances. Conscientious Americans 
are painfully aware o f this fact today, as the nation moves toward war in Iraq and the 
administration o f George W. Bush becomes increasingly obstinate about entertaining 
conflicting opinions. However, perhaps it is the very flexibility o f our ambivalent press 
tradition that makes such retrenchment possible; would Americans stand for such 
repressive measures if they were not confident in the knowledge that future peace would 
bring an attendant devolution o f expressive freedom? In the end, the only consistent 
tradition o f  press freedom in the American past is one o f constant ebb and flow.
APPENDIX
The Sedition Act o f 1798
An Act, in addition to the act, entitled “An act fo r the punishment o f  certain crimes 
against the United States. ”
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House o f  Representatives o f  the 
United States o f America, in Congress assembled, That if any persons shall unlawfully 
combine or conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or measures o f the 
government of the United States, which are or shall be directed by proper authority, or to 
impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or prevent any 
person holding a place or office in or under the government of the United States, from 
undertaking, performing or executing his trust or duty; or if any person or persons, with 
intent as aforesaid, shall counsel, advise or attempt to procure any insurrection, riot, 
unlawful assembly, or combination, whether such conspiracy, threatening, counsel, 
advice, or attempt shall have the proposed effect or not, he or they shall be deemed guilty 
o f a high misdemeanor, and on conviction, before any court of the United States having 
jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and 
by imprisonment during a term not less than six months nor exceeding five years; and 
further, at the discretion of the court may be holden to find sureties for his good behavior 
in such sum, and for such time, as the said court may direct.
Sec. 2 And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or 
publish, shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered, uttered or published, or 
shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any 
false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government o f the United 
States, or the President o f the United States, or either house of the Congress o f the United 
States, with the intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said 
Congress, oe the said President, or to bring them, or either o f them, into contempt or 
disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any o f them, the hatred of the good 
people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any 
unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law o f the United States, or 
any act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the 
powers vested in him by the constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose, or 
defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage, or abet any hostile designs of any foreign 
nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person, being 
thereof convicted before any court o f the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall 
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not 
exceeding two years.
Sec. 3 And be it further enacted and declared, That if any person shall be 
prosecuted under this act, for the writing or publishing any libel aforesaid, it shall be 
lawful for the defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give evidence in his defense, the
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truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury, who 
shall try the cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction 
of the court, as in other cases.
Sec. 4 And be it further enacted, That this act shall continue and be in force until 
the third day o f March, one thousand eight hundred and one, and no longer: Provided, 
that the expiration of the act shall not prevent or defeat a prosecution and punishment of 
any offense against the law, during the time it shall be in force.
Approved. July 14, 1798
Statutes at Large o f  the United States, 1789-1873 (Boston, 1845-73), 1: 596-97
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